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Abstract
Altruism refers to a willingness to benefit others, even at one’s own expense. In
contrast, selfishness refers to prioritizing one’s own interests with no consideration
for others. However, even if an agent is selfish, he might nevertheless act as if he
were altruistic out of selfish concerns triggered when his action is observed; that is,
he might seek to feel pride in acting altruistically and to avoid the shame of acting
selfishly. We call such behavior impurely altruistic. Alternatively, even if an agent is
altruistic, he might nevertheless give in to the temptation to act selfishly. We call such
behavior impurely selfish. This paper axiomatizes a model that distinguishes altruism
from impure altruism and selfishness from impure selfishness. In the model, unique
real numbers separately capture altruism and the other forces of pride, shame, and the
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temptation to act selfishly. We show that the model can describe recent experiments
on dictator games with an exit option. In addition, we describe an empirical puzzle
that government spending only partially crowds out consumers’ donations, contrary to
the prediction based on standard consumer theory.
Keywords: Impure altruism, altruism, warm glow, pride, shame, temptation, dictator
games, and preferences on sets.
JEL Classification Numbers: D03, D63, D64, D81.
1 Introduction
Altruism refers to a willingness to benefit others, even at one’s own expense. Selfishness,
the opposite of altruism, refers to prioritizing one’s own interests, with a concomitant lack
of consideration for others. While these definitions may seem clear, it is difficult to detect
from an agent’s actions alone whether he is truly altruistic or selfish.
Even if an agent is indifferent to the welfare of others and therefore selfish by definition,
he might nevertheless act as if he were truly altruistic (i.e., act to benefit others) out of
selfish concerns triggered when his action is observed; that is, he might seek to feel pride in
having acted altruistically or to avoid the shame of having acted selfishly.
In contrast to pure altruism, we say that an agent exhibits impure altruism if he chooses
an action that benefits others in order to feel pride in acting altruistically and to avoid the
shame of acting selfishly. (In this paper, the terms altruism and pure altruism will be used
interchangeably, as will the terms selfishness and pure selfishness.)
On the other hand, even if an agent is willing to benefit others and is therefore by
definition altruistic, he might nevertheless give in to the temptation to act selfishly. In
contrast to pure selfishness, we say that an agent exhibits impure selfishness if the temptation
to act selfishly motivates him to depart from his tendency to act altruistically.1 An agent
1Of course, such an agent could also be said to exhibit impure altruism, since his altruistic tendencies
could be seen as rendered “impure” whenever he gives in to the temptation to act selfishly. However, we feel
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can exhibit impure selfishness, especially when an immediate payoff is at stake.2
Moreover, these three forces–pride, shame, and the temptation to act selfishly–could
interact in conflicting ways in affecting an agent’s actions.3 For example, an agent could
behave impurely altruistically even if he feels a temptation to act selfishly, when his desire
to avoid the shame has overwhelmed the temptation. Conversely, an agent could behave
impurely selfishly even if he knows that he will feel shame at doing so, when the temptation
has overwhelmed such shame.
In the axiomatic literature on preferences over menus temptation and shame have been
studied separately: Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) have proposed a model of temptation; Dil-
lenberger and Sadowski (2012) have proposed a model of shame. In an independent project,
Evren and Minardi (2014) study warm glow, which is a similar phenomenon to pride. More-
over, in the latter two works, the parameters capturing the psychological effects are not
uniquely identified.
The purpose of this paper is to axiomatize a model in which unique real numbers sepa-
rately capture altruism as well as pride in acting altruistically, shame of acting selfishly, and
the temptation to act selfishly. The improved identification comes from a linear structure
of our model. On the other hand, the linear structure makes our model restrictive. For
example, our model satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). That is, the
decision maker will not change his choice even if an irrelevant element is removed from his
set of alternatives. We discuss those restrictions at the end of Section 2.
Our model can capture the trade-off between the three forces and, thereby, distinguish
that the term impure altruism is more suitable for the selfish person who acts altruistically when motivated
by his inherent selfishness. As a result, we use the term impure selfishness for the opposite situation, namely,
a typically altruistic agent who sometimes gives in to the temptation to act selfishly.
2Indeed, Noor and Ren (2011) found that in their experiments the average donation from dictators to
receivers has significantly decreased when the timing of the payment to the subjects is changed from one
month later to immediately after the dictators’ choices.
3Throughout this paper, when we use the terms, pride in acting altruistically, shame of acting selfishly,
and the temptation to act selfishly, we are referring to individual acts of an agent, and not to an agent’s
personality or general tendencies. For example, if we say that an agent seeks to “feel pride in acting
altruistically,” that description will refer to the pride in one particular altruistic act, rather than to the
agent’s typical or habitual behavior.
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altruism from impure altruism and selfishness from impure selfishness. For example, we can
show that the agent could behave impurely altruistically if his index of shame is larger than
that of the temptation; otherwise, an agent could behave impurely selfishly. Moreover, we
provide axiomatizations of special cases which capture only pride, shame, or the temptation,
respectively.
We adopt the same set up as Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012), which distinguishes the
ex-ante private stage and the ex-post public stage. The setup is necessary to study pride,
shame, and the temptation at the same time.
To conclude the introduction, we clarify (i) the definition of shame in comparison with a
related emotion, guilt; (ii) the definition of pride; and (iii) the difference between temptation
and two other psychological effects, pride and shame. There is a clear distinction between
shame and guilt in Psychology. According to Hiebert (1985, p. 213), “An agent may suffer
from guilt although no one else knows of his or her misdeed.” This is the crucial difference
between shame and guilt: an agent would not suffer from shame if no one else knows of his
misdeed. In this paper, we do not consider guilt; we focus on shame alone. To study guilt,
the two stage setup is not enough because the agent would feel guilt even at the ex-ante
private stage.
There are various definitions of pride in Psychology. (See Lea and Webley (1997) for a
survey on pride in Psychology and for a discussion on economic consequences of pride.) In
Development Psychology, pride has often been studied in its comparison with shame. (See
Scheff (1988) and Taylor (1985) for example.) Scheff (1988) claims that conformity to social
expectations causes “the pleasure of pride and fellow feeling”; while disconformity causes
“the punishment of embarrassment, shame, or humiliation”. In this paper, we consider the
particular social expectations that an agent should act altruistically. Hence, by pride of
acting altruistically, we mean a feeling of pleasure derived from the social recognition of
one’s altruistic choice. Even without social recognition and even if an agent is not altruistic,
he may derive a feeling of pleasure, such as warm glow, from one’s altruistic choice. We do
not study such feelings in this paper.
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Finally, note that the temptation to act selfishly is different from shame and pride in the
sense that the temptation is not caused by the publicity of choices but by the immediacy of
the payoff at the ex-post stage. However, we think that the effect of temptation at the ex-post
public stage is so significant that we should incorporate the effect into our model. Indeed, in
experiments on dictator games, Noor and Ren (2011) found that the average donation from
dictators to receivers is 65 percent of the total endowment when the payment to subjects
is made one month later, but only 38 percent when the payment is made immediately after
the dictators’ choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a preview of
the results. In Section 3, we provide a literature review. In Section 4.1, we present the
model and the axioms. In Section 4.2, we present a representation theorem and a sketch
of the proof. In Section 4.3, we show the uniqueness of the representation. In Section 5,
we provide axiomatizations of the special cases and discuss their relationship with Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001), Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012), and Evren and Minardi (2014). In
Section 6, we study characterizations of parameters and provide comparative statics. In
Section 7, we study the agent’s ex-post choices and provide characterizations of impure
altruism and impure selfishness. In Section 8, we show that the model is consistent with
existing experimental evidence. In Section 9, we provide an application. All proofs are in
Appendix.
2 Preview of Results
2.1 Model
We investigate a decision maker who determines an allocation between himself and other
passive agents. The decision maker’s choice consists of two stages. In the first ex-ante stage,
the decision maker chooses a set of allocations. We assume that the other agents do not
know that the decision maker has such choices. His ex-ante choices are private.
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In the ex-post stage, the decision maker chooses an allocation from the set that he chose
ex-ante. We assume that other agents can observe which allocation the decision maker
chooses from the set, even though they do not know that he chose the set ex-ante.
Ex-postEx-ante
Choose a set A of allocations privately Choose an allocation from the set A publicly
Figure 1: Two-Stage Decision Problem
Because his choices will be public at the ex-post public stage, the decision maker could
anticipate that he will feel pride in acting altruistically, or shame of acting selfishly at
that stage. In addition, the decision maker could anticipate that he will suffer from the
temptation to act selfishly ex-post. In light of these potential ex-post feelings, the decision
maker chooses a set ex-ante. (We, henceforth, call these three feelings simply, pride, shame,
and temptation, when there is no danger of confusion.) This set up is not new: Dillenberger
and Sadowski (2012) have proposed the same model that distinguishes the ex-ante private
stage and the ex-post public stage to study the effect of shame.
To introduce the representation, we first define some notation. The decision maker is
denoted by 1 and the finite set of other agents is denoted by S. Define I = {1}∪S to be the
set of all agents. A payoff profile p ≡ (pi)i∈I is called an allocation. An allocation p is also
denoted by (p1, pS), where p1 is a payoff to the decision maker and pS ≡ (pi)i∈S is a payoff
profile to the other agents.
When the decision maker chooses a set of allocations at the ex-ante private stage, he
maximizes the following utility function. The utility of a set A is :
V (A) = max
p∈A
[∑
i∈I
αiu(pi) + β1max
q∈A
α1(u(q1)− u(p1))− βS max
r∈A
(
∑
i∈S
αiu(ri)−
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi))
]
, (1)
where α1 > 0, β1 < 1, βS ≥ 0, and
∑
i∈S αi = 1. Moreover, (αi)i∈I , β1, and βS are unique
and u is unique up to positive affine transformation. The maximizer p over A is the decision
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maker’s ex-post public choice from A.
The first term of the model,
∑
i∈I αiu(pi), captures the decision maker’s utilitarian eval-
uation of his ex-post choice of p. Hence, we call the model a generalized utilitarian (GU)
model.
The second term, β1maxq∈A α1(u(q1)−u(p1)), captures the utility arising from the pride
of acting altruistically if β1 ≥ 0 or the disutility arising from the temptation to act selfishly
(i.e., the temptation to maximize his own allocation) if β1 ≤ 0. The utility and disutility are
proportional to the difference between the maximum selfish utility maxq∈A α1u(q1) and the
actual utility α1u(p1) attained by the decision maker’s ex-post choice of p. The difference
captures how much the decision maker controls himself so as to keep himself from acting
selfishly (i.e., from maximizing his selfish interest).
Similarly, the third term of the GU model, βS maxr∈A(
∑
i∈S αiu(ri) −
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)),
captures the disutility due to the shame of acting selfishly. The disutility is proportional to
the difference between the maximum social utilities maxr∈A
∑
i∈S αiu(ri) (i.e., the maximum
sum of the utilities of the other agents) and the actual social utilities
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) attained
by the decision maker’s ex-post choice of p. Hence, the difference captures how much utility
the other agents lose because of the decision maker’s ex-post choice.
2.2 α captures Altruism and Selfishness; β captures Impure Altru-
ism and Impure Selfishness
In the GU model, the relative weight on the social utility with respect to the selfish utility
captures the level of pure altruism. Since
∑
i∈S αi = 1, the relative weight is (
∑
i∈S αi)/α1 =
1/α1. In other words, α1 captures the level of pure selfishness. To see this interpretation of
α1, note that whether or not the decision maker is purely altruistic is determined through
his ex-ante private choices. This is because in private choices the decision maker would feel
neither pride nor shame. Moreover, in ex-ante choices he would not feel temptation.
In the GU model, ex-ante private choices between allocations p and q are formalized as
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choices between the singleton sets, such as {p} and {q }. Hence, the utility function that
captures only pure altruism is as follows:
V ({p}) =
∑
i∈I
αiu(pi) = α1u(p1) +
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi). (2)
Therefore, the smaller α1 is, the more the decision maker is willing to sacrifice his own
allocation p1 to improve the others’ allocations pS.
Impure Altruism
Impure Selfishness
0
PrideTemptation
Shame
βS
β1
β1 < 0 β1 > 0
βS < −β1
βS > −β1
Figure 2: Pride, Shame, and Temptation Cause Impure Altruism and Impure Selfishness
In contrast to the ex-ante private choices, ex-post public choices can be affected by
pride, shame, and the temptation to act selfishly. To see this effect, note that (1) can be
expressed as V (A) = maxp∈A[(1−β1)α1u(p1)+ (1+βS)
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)]+β1maxq∈A α1u(q1)−
βS maxr∈A
∑
i∈S αiu(ri) for any set A of allocations. This representation shows that the
ex-post public choice p (i.e., the maximizer over A) maximizes
U(p) ≡ (1− β1)α1u(p1) + (1 + βS)
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi). (3)
Note that since β1 is always smaller than one, the function U is monotonic in the decision
maker’s utility u(p1) and the social utility
∑
i∈S αiu(pi). Hence, no matter what the pa-
rameters are, the decision maker will never derive utility from decreasing his own utility (or
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social utility) unless it increases social utility (or his own utility, respectively).
A comparison between (3) and (2) shows that the decision maker’s choices become more
altruistic at the ex-post public stage (i.e., in (3)) than they are at the ex-ante private stage
(i.e., in (2)) if and only if βS > −β1. To see this note that the relative weight on the social
utility
∑
i∈S αiu at the ex-post public stage is (1 + βS)/((1− β1)α1). The relative weight at
the ex-ante private stage is 1/α1. Hence, the relative weight at the ex-post public stage is
higher than the relative weight at the ex-ante private stage if and only if 1 + βS > 1− β1.
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In this way, βS > −β1 captures impure altruism caused by pride in acting altruistically or
shame of acting selfishly. In the same way, βS < −β1 captures impure selfishness motivated
by the temptation to act selfishly.
There are some limitations of the GU model. As it can be seen in (3), the ex-post
choice satisfies IIA. That is, the decision maker will not change his ex-post choice even if an
unchosen element is removed from his set of alternatives. In addition, the GU model does
not incorporate inequality aversion since the GU model implies that the decision maker is a
utilitarian. Both limitations result from the linearity of the GU model, which at the same
time make it possible for us to identify the parameters (i.e., α and β) uniquely.
Second, since the model is based on observable preferences at the ex-ante (private) stage,
an outside observer must know the decision maker’s choices at the stage. Hence, the GU
model does not incorporate pride and shame resulting from the outside observer. This
limitation might not be so serious because, by definition, the outside observer is not included
in the set S of the other agents. Therefore, the outside observer’s utility is not determined
by the decision maker’s choices. Consequently, the decision maker would feel little pride and
shame resulting from the outside observer.5
Third, in the GU model, the decision maker evaluates the other agents’ allocations (pi)i∈S
by using his own utility function u. This limitation can be fixed easily by using additional
4We provide behavioral characterizations of impure altruism and impure selfishness in Section 7.2.
5Indeed, in a well-designed experiment, subjects should not consider experimenters’ intentions or their
welfare. In such an experiment, the experimenters should have no effect on whether the decision maker feels
shame or pride.
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primitive preferences (%i)i∈S of the other agents. With these additional primitives, we could
immediately obtain an extension of the GU model in which each agent’s allocation pi is
evaluated by the agent’s utility function ui representing %i.
Finally, in the GU model, the temptation to act selfishly and pride of acting altruistically
do not coexist. The decision maker can exhibit either pride in acting altruistically (i.e.,
β1 > 0) or the temptation to act selfishly (i.e., β1 < 0) but not both. This is because the
decision maker feels pride in acting altruistically only when he does not yield to such a
temptation. In other words, what can be captured in the GU model by the index β1 is the
net effect of the temptation and the pride. Since our main interest in the paper is to identify
the effects of those feelings on choices, this limitation may not be so serious because at the
end only the net effects matter on choices.
To conclude the section, we mention experimental evidence and an application. We show
that the GU model can describe recent experimental evidence on dictator games with an
exit option such as Dana et al. (2006), Broberg et al. (2007), and Lazear et al. (2012). The
experimental design fits with our model. The GU model can be consistent not only with
the choice of exit but also with the finding that both low-level and high-level donors play the
dictator games, while the medium-level donors exit.
In addition, we show that the GU model is consistent with a classical empirical puzzle
involving charitable donations. Standard consumer theory, which assumes that consumers’
preferences are solely defined on allocations, predicts that government spending for charity
should completely crowd out their donation. However, empirical evidence suggests that the
crowding out is far from complete, and is at most about 50 percent. (See Andreoni (2006)
for a survey of the evidence.) By applying the GU model, we describe the partial crowding
out under the condition that consumers’ pride dominates their shame (i.e., β1 > βS).
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3 Related Literature
In this section, we overview the related literature. In Section 5, we explicitly compare our
models and axioms with the models and axioms studied in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001),
Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012), and Evren and Minardi (2014).
In the axiomatic literature on preferences over menus, since Dekel, Lipman, and Rusti-
chini (2001) proposed a general frame work, many models have been proposed in specific
contexts. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) propose a general model of temptation. However,
they do not study social decision making in particular. In their model, moreover, the self-
control problem is captured by the difference between two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions. In contrast, we study a specific temptation in a social context: the temptation
to act selfishly. Moreover, the GU model captures the self-control problem by the unique
nonnegative number β1, which facilitates distinguishing selfishness from impure selfishness.
Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012) have proposed the first model on social decision making
within the literature on preferences over menus.6 The purpose of their paper is to capture
shame of acting selfishly; the other forces, namely pride and temptation, are outside of their
scope. In their model, shame is captured by two nonunique functions. Because of this
generality, their model can allow violations of IIA and inequality aversion.
Independent of our paper, several recent papers address related phenomena. Noor and
Ren (2011) study guilt and temptation to avoid guilt by extending the model of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001) into preferences over menus of menus of allocations. Guilt is an impor-
tance issue but, as mentioned, there is a clear distinction between shame and guilt. In this
paper, we focus on shame.
Evren and Minardi (2014) study warm glow. Their model is based on an interesting
idea of relating warm glow to the freedom to be selfish. In Evren and Minardi’s (2014) main
result, their primitive preferences are different from ours: they focus a preference over sets of
Pareto undominated allocations. Their model is general enough to allow for violations of IIA.
6Neilson (2009) also proposed a model of shame. Neilson’s (2009) model is not axiomatic.
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On the other hand, due to this generality, their representation lacks uniqueness properties.
Feddersen and Sandroni (2009) also provide an axiomatic model of warm glow. Their
approach is different from the other axiomatic papers including ours: They study a decision
maker’s choice function and an aspiration function that captures the decision maker’s nor-
mative concerns. One advantage of their approach is that they dispense with ex-ante choices
of sets. However, they need the aspiration functions instead.
Yagasaki (2013) provides an axiomatic model of pride and shame. As primitives of his
model, Yagasaki (2013) uses a function, which captures reference behavior, in addition to
preference relations over sets. In his model, the decision maker may feel shame and pride by
comparing his behavior and the reference behavior.
Finally, we mention two nonaxiomatic papers. Andreoni (1989, 1990) has proposed the
celebrated model of warm glow. By using the model, Andreoni (1989, 1990) has obtained
conditions that capture the partial crowding out, although the conditions are not easy to
interpret. In Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) model of warm glow, the decision maker can obtain
positive utility by his donation even if his donation is private to the other agents and does
not improve the welfare of the other agents. Hence, donations captured by Andreoni’s (1989,
1990) model are essentially different from donations captured by the GU model.
Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, and Sobel (2011) have studied menu-dependent
other-regarding preferences. Their purpose is to analyze competitive market outcomes in
economies where agents have such preferences. They proposed a general utility function
that depends on the budge sets (opportunities, in their terminology), although they do not
provide an axiomatization.
4 Model
Remember that the decision maker is denoted by 1 and the finite set of other agents is
denoted by S. Hence, I ≡ {1} ∪ S is the set of all agents. Let Z be a finite set. A lottery
is a probability distribution over Z. We denote the set of lotteries by ∆(Z). For simplicity,
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we assume that a payoff for each agent is a lottery. Hence, the set of allocations is (∆(Z))I .
Note that outcomes of lotteries are not correlated across agents. We denote the set of all
nonempty closed subsets of (∆(Z))I by A . An element of A is called a set.
The primitive of our model is a binary relation % on A that describes the decision
maker’s ex-ante private preference. We denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of % by
≻ and ∼, respectively. We endow A with the topology generated by the Hausdorff metric.7
We use the following notation. Sets are denoted by A,B, and C ∈ A . Allocations are
denoted by p, q, l, and r ∈ (∆(Z))I . Lotteries are denoted by p, q, l, and r ∈ ∆(Z). In
particular, lotteries for agent i ∈ I are denoted by pi, qi, li, and ri ∈ ∆(Z). We define convex
combinations of two sets, two allocations, and two lotteries in the usual manner.8 For a
singleton, we write p instead of {p}.
4.1 Axioms
Axiom (Standard): % is a nondegenerate, complete, transitive, and continuous binary
relation.9
Axiom (Independence): For all α ∈ [0, 1] and A,B,C ∈ A , A % B if and only if αA+ (1−
α)C % αB + (1− α)C.
As mentioned, the GU model does not capture inequality aversion. This is mainly because
of the independence axiom. (To incorporate inequality aversion, in Appendix C, we propose
an extension of the GU model by weakening the independence axiom.)
We define the decision maker’s risk preference %1 on ∆(Z) and social preference %S on
(∆(Z))S as follows:
7dh(A,B) = max{maxp∈Aminq∈B d(p, q ),maxp∈B minq∈A d(p, q )}, where d is the Euclidean metric. (Re-
member that p and q are |Z|·|I| dimensional real-valued vectors. Hence, d is the Euclidean metric on R|Z|·|I|.)
8For all pi, qi ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ [0, 1], αpi + (1 − α)qi is a lottery such that (αpi + (1 − α)qi)(z) =
αpi(z) + (1 − α)qi(z) for each z ∈ Z. For all p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and α ∈ [0, 1], αp + (1 − α)q is an allocation
such that (αp + (1 − α)q ) = (αpi + (1 − α)qi)i∈I . For all A,B ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1], αA + (1 − α)B =
{αp+ (1 − α)q|p ∈ A and q ∈ B}.
9Formally, the continuity is defined as follows: the sets {B ∈ A |B % A} and {B ∈ A |A % B} are closed
in the Hausdorff metric topology. % is nondegenerate if A ≻ B for some A,B ∈ A .
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Definition: (i) For all p1, q1 ∈ ∆(Z), p1 %1 q1 if (p1, lS) % (q1, lS) for some lS ∈ (∆(Z))
S;
(ii) for all pS, qS ∈ (∆(Z))
S, pS %S qS if (l1, pS) % (l1, qS) for some l1 ∈ ∆(Z).
The binary relation %1 captures the decision maker’s individual risk preference, and %S
captures his social preference (i.e., his preference on other agents’ allocations), which reflects
the decision maker’s belief about the other agents’ preferences.10 To see these interpretations,
note that in part (i) of the definition, the two allocations differ only with respect to the
decision maker’s allocations, so that his choice between the two allocations does not affect
other agents’ allocations. Hence, the decision maker would allow himself to choose one
allocation based solely on his individual preference.
Similarly, in part (ii) of the definition, the two allocations differ only with respect to
other agents’ allocations, so that the decision maker’s choice between the two allocations
does not affect his own allocation. Hence, the decision maker should choose one allocation
to maximize the anticipated welfare of other agents. It can be shown that the preferences
%1 and %S are well defined under the independence axiom.
We assume the following consistency condition between the two preferences.
Axiom (Consistency): For all pS, qS ∈ (∆(Z))
S, if pi %1 qi for all i ∈ S, then pS %S qS.
Moreover, if pi %1 qi for all i ∈ S and pi ≻1 qi for some i ∈ S, then pS ≻S qS.
The consistency condition means that if every other agents’ allocation is better in pS than
in qS according to the decision maker’s individual preference %1, then pS is better than qS
in his social preference %S. The decision maker uses his individual preference to evaluate
the other agents’ allocations because the decision maker here is not a social planner and
might not know the other agents’ preferences. This axiom implies that the decision maker
evaluates the other agents’ allocations (pi)i∈S by using his own utility function u.
The next axiom requires that % satisfy the standard Pareto condition.
Axiom (Pareto): For any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I , if p1 %1 q1 and pS %S qS, then {p} % {q}.
Moreover if either p1 ≻1 q1 or pS ≻S qS, then {p} ≻ {q}.
10For each i ∈ {1, S}, we write the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %i by ≻i and ∼i, respectively.
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The next axiom, Dominance, says that the decision maker is indifferent to adding an
allocation that is dominated both in individual preference and in social preference.
Axiom (Dominance): For any set A ∈ A and p ∈ (∆(Z))I , if there exists q ∈ A such that
q1 %1 p1 and qS %S pS, then A ∼ A ∪ p.
This axiom means that if an allocation p is dominated both in the individual preference and
in his social preference, then the decision maker should not choose p from A∪ p. Moreover,
having the option to choose p does not cause the decision maker’s feeling of shame, pride,
and the temptation. Hence, the decision maker is indifferent between A and A ∪ p.
The next axiom is a weaker version of the axiom of Strategic Rationality. Kreps (1963)
defines Strategic Rationality as follows: A % B ⇒ A ∼ A ∪ B. Strategic Rationality
means that the decision maker has neither a preference for commitment nor a preference for
flexibility. Because of the shame of acting selfishly and the temptation of acting selfishly,
the decision maker can have a preference for commitment. On the other hand because of
the feeling of pride of acting altruistically he can have a preference for flexibility.
To introduce the weaker version of Strategic Rationality, we need the following definitions.
A similar definition appears in Kopylov (2012). Given a set A and any element p ∈ A, say
that p is individually optimal in A if p1 %1 q1 for all q ∈ A and that p is socially optimal in
A if pS %S qS for all q ∈ A. For any allocation p ∈ (∆(Z))
I , define
A 1p = {A ∈ A |p is individually optimal in A},
A Sp = {A ∈ A |p is socially optimal in A}.
For example, if A,B ∈ A 1p (or A
S
p ), then A and B share the same optimal element in %1
(or in %S respectively).
Axiom (Weak Strategic Rationality): For any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and A,B ∈ A 1p ∩A
S
q ,
A % B ⇒ A ∼ A ∪ B.
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This axiom assumes three things: (i) the decision maker feels shame of acting selfishly by
not choosing the socially optimal allocation; (ii) he feels temptation to choose the individually
optimal allocation; and (iii) he can feel the pride of acting altruistically by overcoming such
temptation. Consider two sets A and B that share the same socially optimal allocation
and the same individually optimal allocation. Then A and A ∪ B also share the same
socially optimal allocation and the same individually optimal allocation. Hence, under the
assumption, the decision maker’s utility or disutility caused by the shame, the temptation,
and the pride are the same in A, B, and A ∪ B. Therefore, the only one reason that the
decision maker could prefer A to B is that A contains the optimal allocation in his ex-post
preference. Consequently, the decision maker should be indifferent between A and A ∪ B
because he can select the same ex-post optimal allocation of A from both A and A ∪ B.
The last axiom captures shame of acting selfishly: the decision maker feels shame when
his ex-post choice is judged inferior by the social preference %S . Hence, the decision maker
might have a preference for commitment in order to exclude the socially superior allocation
from his choice set as follows:
Axiom (Shame of Acting Selfishly): For any p, q, r ∈ (∆(Z))I ,


(i) qS ≻S pS
(ii) r1 ≻1 p1
(iii) {p, q, r} ≻ {q, r}

⇒ {p} % {p, q}.
By (i), q is better than p in the social preference (i.e., qS ≻S pS). On the other hand, (ii)
and (iii) imply that p is better than q in the ex-post preference. To see this, note that by
(ii), p is not individually optimal (i.e., r1 ≻1 p1). Since even a purely selfish agent, who
maximizes %1, would not choose p, the act of not choosing p cannot reveal the decision
maker’s altruism. Thus, the decision maker will not experience any feeling of pride from
having (but not exercising) the option to choose p. Therefore, the only one reason that
the decision maker could prefer {p, q, r} to {q, r} as in (iii), is that he prefers to choose p
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ex-post.
Hence, the decision maker will choose socially inferior allocation p from {p, q} at the
ex-post public stage, which may cause shame of acting selfishly. Consequently, the decision
maker would prefer not to have the option to choose q (i.e., {p} % {p, q}) at the ex-ante
private stage.
4.2 Representation Theorem
Theorem: The following statements are equivalent:
(a) % satisfies Standard, Independence, Consistency, Pareto, Dominance, Weak Strategic
Rationality, and Shame of Acting Selfishly.
(b) There exist a nonconstant von Neumann-Morgenstern function u on ∆(Z) and real num-
bers (α, β1, βS) such that % is represented by
V (A) = max
p∈A
[∑
i∈I
αiu(pi) + β1max
q∈A
α1(u(q1)− u(p1))− βS max
r∈A
(
∑
i∈S
αiu(ri)−
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi))
]
, (4)
where α1 > 0,
∑
i∈S αi = 1, β1 < 1, and βS ≥ 0.
By the definitions of %1 and %S, the theorem trivially implies that %1 and %S are
represented by u and
∑
i∈S αiu, respectively.
In the rest of the section, we provide an intuition for the proof of sufficiency. By In-
dependence, we show that there exist a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u on
∆(Z) and positive numbers {αi}i∈S such that (i) u represents %1 on ∆(Z) and (ii)
∑
i∈S αiu
represents %S and
∑
i∈S αi = 1. For any set A of allocations, we consider a set of utilities of
allocations in A. Formally, for all A ∈ A , define u(A) = {(u(p1),
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)) ∈ R
2|p ∈ A}
and A ∗ = {u(A)|A ∈ A }. Define
A∗ %∗ B∗ if A % B,
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where u(A) = A∗ and u(B) = B∗. By mainly using Dominance, we can show that %∗ is well
defined (i.e., if A∗ = B∗, then A ∼ B). It is easy to translate the axioms on % to axioms on
%∗.
Then, we apply Kopylov (2009, Theorem 2.1) to obtain a linear representation for %∗.
Because of the linearity of the model, we can obtain a function µ : R→ R such that V ∗(A∗) =
∑
λ∈R
(
maxu∈A∗ λu1+(1−λ)uS
)
µ(λ) represents %∗. Moreover, supp(µ) ≡ {λ ∈ R|µ(λ) 6= 0}
is finite.
To obtain the GU model, we need to show that (i) µ(1) 6= 0, (ii) µ(0) < 0, (iii) µ(λ∗) > 0
for some λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), and (iv) µ(λ) is zero for all of the other λ ∈ R. In other words, to obtain
the GU model, unlike the other additive models such as Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and
Kopylov (2012), it is not enough to know the number of the elements of {λ ∈ R|µ(λ) > 0}
and {λ ∈ R|µ(λ) < 0}. To obtain the GU model, it is crucial to identify the elements of
{λ ∈ R|µ(λ) > 0} and {λ ∈ R|µ(λ) < 0}.
For this purpose, fix ε < 1
2
and for all λ ∈ R, define
u∗1(λ) =
1
2
+
ελ
‖(λ, 1− λ)‖
, u∗S(λ) =
1
2
+
ε(1− λ)
‖(λ, 1− λ)‖
, and u∗(λ) = (u∗1(λ), u
∗
S(λ)).
Then u∗(λ) is on the boundary of Bε(
1
2
, 1
2
) (i.e., the closed ball with radius ε centered at
(1
2
, 1
2
)). We can show that for all λ, λ′ ∈ R such that λ 6= λ′, λu∗1(λ) + (1 − λ)u
∗
S(λ) >
λu∗1(λ
′) + (1 − λ)u∗S(λ
′). To put it simply, for any λ ∈ R, u∗(λ) ≡ (u1(λ), uS(λ)) is unique
maximizer of λu1 + (1− λ)uS among the sets {u
∗(λ′)|λ′ ∈ R} of utility pairs.
By using this property of u∗, we can construct menus of utilities by which we can identify
the sign of µ on any λ ∈ R. To see this fix λ ∈ R. Define A∗ = {u∗(λ′)|λ′ ∈ supp(µ)}.
Then, it must hold that A∗ ≻∗ A∗ \ {u∗(λ)} if and only if µ(λ) > 0.11 Based on this
idea, by using Dominance and Weak Strategic Rationality, we can show the aforementioned
properties (i.e., (i)–(iv)). Consequently, there exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that µ(λ∗) > 0 and
V ∗(A∗) = µ(1)maxu∈A∗ u1 + µ(λ
∗)maxu∈A∗(λ
∗u1 + (1− λ
∗)uS) + µ(0)maxu∈A∗ uS. By using
11Because supp(µ) is finite, it can be shown that A∗ \ {u∗(λ′)} ∈ A ∗.
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Shame of Acting Selfishly, we can show that µ(0) ≤ 0.
By defining α1, β1, and βS based on µ, we obtain V
∗(A∗) = maxu∈A∗
(
(1 − β1)α1u1 +
(1+ βS)uS
)
+ β1α1maxu∈A∗ u1− βS maxu∈A∗ uS.
12 Finally, for all A ∈ A , we define V (A) =
V ∗(A∗). Then, A % B ⇔ A∗ %∗ B∗ ⇔ V ∗(A∗) ≥ V ∗(B∗) ⇔ V (A) ≥ V (B). Hence, V
represents %. By arranging the terms and substituting u1 = u(p1) and uS =
∑
i∈S αiu(pi),
we obtain the GU model.
4.3 Uniqueness of Parameters
In the GU model, the parameters α and β are unique.
Proposition 1 If two GU models with (u,α,β) and (u′,α′,β′) represent the same %, then
β1 = β
′
1, βS = β
′
S, αi = α
′
i for all i ∈ I, and there exist real numbers a, b such that a > 0
and u = au′ + b.
On the other hand, in the models of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Dillenberger and Sad-
owski (2012), and Evren and Minardi (2014), parameters capturing the temptation, shame,
and pride are not uniquely identified. As mentioned, the improved identification in the GU
model comes from its linear structure. At the same time, the linear structure makes the GU
model restrictive. In Section 5.2, we discuss this issue in detail.
5 Axiomatizations of Special Cases
In Section 5.1, we provide axiomatizations of the special cases of GU models with β1 = 0
and βS = 0. In Section 5.2, we discuss the relationship between the special cases and Gul
and Pesendorfer (2001), Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012), and Evren and Minardi (2014).
12α1 = µ(λ
∗)λ∗ + µ(1), β1 =
µ(1)
µ(λ∗)λ∗+µ(1) , and βS = −µ(0).
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5.1 Special Cases with β1 = 0 and βS = 0
In this section, we provide axiomatizations of two special cases of GU models. Each of
them is a special cases of either Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Dillenberger and Sadowski
(2012), or Evren and Minardi (2014). Both models are characterized by stronger versions
of Weak Strategic Rationality. Remember that Weak Strategic Rationality is defined as
follows: for any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and A,B ∈ A 1p ∩ A
S
q , if A % B, then A ∼ A ∪ B.
Remember that if A,B ∈ A Sp (or A
1
p ), then A and B share the same optimal element in %S
(or in %1 respectively).
To obtain the special case of the GU model in which β1 = 0, we strengthen Weak Strategic
Rationality as follows:
Axiom (Weak Strategic Rationality I): For any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and A,B ∈ A Sp ,
A % B ⇒ A ∼ A ∪ B.
This axiom assumes that the decision maker feels shame of acting selfishly by not choosing
the socially optimal allocation. Consider two sets A and B that share the same socially
optimal allocation. Then, A and A ∪ B also share the same socially optimal allocation.
Hence, under the assumption, the decision maker’s disutility caused by shame are the same
in A, B, and A ∪B. Therefore, the only one reason that the decision maker could prefer A
to B is that A contains the optimal allocation in his ex-post preference. Consequently, the
decision maker should be indifferent between A and A ∪ B because he can select the same
ex-post optimal element of A from both A and A ∪ B.
Corollary 1 The following statements (a) and (b) are equivalent:
(a) % satisfies Standard, Independence, Consistency, Pareto, Dominance, and Weak Strate-
gic Rationality I, and Shame of Acting Selfishly.
(b) There exist a GU model (u,α, (β1, βS)) with β1 = 0 that represents %.
Moreover,if two GU models with (u,α, (0, βS)) and (u
′,α′, (0, β ′S)) represent the same %,
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then βS = β
′
S, αi = α
′
i for all i ∈ I, and there exist real numbers a, b such that a > 0 and
u = au′ + b.
In contrast to Theorem, in Corollary 1 we impose Weak Strategic Rationality I, instead
of Weak Strategic Rationality.
In the following, we provide a characterization of the other special case of GU model
in which βS = 0. For this purpose, we need to strengthen Weak Strategic Rationality as
follows:
Axiom (Weak Strategic Rationality II): For any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and A,B ∈ A 1p ,
A % B ⇒ A ∼ A ∪ B.
Weak Strategic Rationality II is different from Weak Strategic Rationality I only in one
point. In Weak Strategic Rationality II, we require A,B ∈ A 1p , not A,B ∈ A
S
p . This is
because in the special case of the GU model in which βS = 0, what matters to the decision
maker is the individually optimal allocations, not the socially optimal allocations.
Weak Strategic Rationality II assumes that (i) the decision maker feels temptation to
choose the individually optimal allocation; and (ii) he can feel the pride of acting altruistically
by overcoming such temptation.
Instead of Shame of Acting Selfishly, we need a stronger version of the axiom:
Axiom (No Shame of Acting Selfishly): For any p, q, r ∈ (∆(Z))I ,


(i) qS ≻S pS
(ii) r1 ≻1 p1
(iii) {p, q, r} ≻ {q, r}

⇒ {p} ∼ {p, q}.
As explained, the condition (i), (ii), and (iii) ensure that the decision maker would
choose p ex-post but p is socially inferior to q. Hence, if the decision maker anticipates the
feeling of shame by not choosing q, then he would prefer not to have the option to choose q
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(i.e., {p} ≻ {p, q}) at the ex-ante private stage. If the decision maker does not anticipate
any feeling of shame, then he should be indifferent to have the option to choose q (i.e.,
{p} ∼ {p, q}).
Corollary 2 The following statements (a) and (b) are equivalent:
(a) % satisfies Standard, Independence, Consistency, Pareto, Dominance, Weak Strategic
Rationality II, and No Shame of Acting Selfishly.
(b) There exist a GU model (u,α, (β1, βS)) with βS = 0 that represents %.
Moreover, if two GU models with (u,α, (β1, 0)) and (u
′,α′, (β ′1, 0)) represent the same %,
then β1 = β
′
1, αi = α
′
i for all i ∈ I, and there exist real numbers a, b such that a > 0 and
u = au′ + b.
5.2 Comparison with Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012), Evren
and Minardi (2014), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
In this section, we compare the two special cases of the GU model and Dillenberger and
Sadowski (2012), Evren and Minardi (2014), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).13 The GU
model with β1 = 0 is
V (A) = max
p∈A
[∑
i∈I
αiu(pi)− βS max
r∈A
(
∑
i∈S
αiu(ri)−
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi))
]
. (5)
In the model of Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012), the primitive preferences are defined
on the sets of allocations of monetary payoffs.
Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012) derive fairness preferences ≻f from their primitive
preferences % as follows: x ≻f y if there exists a set A such that y ∈ A and A ≻ A ∪ x.
Then, they impose axioms on % as well as on ≻f to axiomatize the following model:
VDS(A) = max
x∈A
[
v(x)− g
(
φ(x),max
y∈A
φ(y)
)]
, (6)
13I really appreciate an associate editor who gave us insightful comments on the comparison.
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where φ represents ≻f and g captures the disutility of shame. The value of g depends on
the social utility φ(x) of the agent’s choice x and the optimal social utility maxy∈A φ(y).
To compare (5) and (6), assume that outcomes are monetary payoffs in (5). Then, (5)
is a special case of (6) in which v =
∑
i∈I αiu, g(a, b) = βS(a − b), and φ =
∑
i∈S αiu. The
linearity of g results from Independence. In (6), g and φ are not uniquely identified. While
in (5), α and βS are uniquely identified. This stronger uniqueness property comes from the
linearity of g, which, at the same time, makes (5) incompatible with violations of IIA.
The additional structure that φ =
∑
i∈S αiu comes mainly from Weak Strategic Ratio-
nality I and Shame of Acting Selfishly. Weak Strategic Rationality I implies that if x ≻f y,
then xS ≻S yS. To see this suppose that not xS ≻S yS but x ≻f y. Then there exists A ∈ A
such that y ∈ A and A ≻ A ∪ x. Since not xS ≻S yS, we have A,A ∪ x ∈ A
S
z for some
z ∈ A. Then by Weak Strategic Rationality I, we obtain A ∼ A∪x, which is a contradiction.
By using Shame of Acting Selfishly and other axioms, it can be shown that if xS ≻S yS,
then x ≻f y. Hence, we obtain xS ≻S yS if and only if x ≻f y. Since ≻S is represented by∑
i∈S αiu and ≻f is represented by φ, we obtain φ =
∑
i∈S αiu under a normalization.
Next we discuss the other special of the GU model with βS = 0:
V (A) = max
p∈A
[∑
i∈I
αiu(pi) + β1max
q∈A
α1(u(q1)− u(p1))
]
. (7)
When β1 > 0, the second term captures pride and when β1 < 0, the second term captures
the temptation to act selfishly. In the following, we discuss the relationship between (7) and
Evren and Minardi (2014) as well as Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).
In the model of Evren and Minardi (2014), the primitive preferences are defined on the
sets of allocations of monetary payoffs. Evren and Minardi (2014) have axiomatized the
following model:
VEM(A) = max
x∈A
U
(
x,max
y∈A
y1 − x1
)
, (8)
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where the first argument captures the evaluation of the allocation x and the second argument
captures the difference between the most selfish allocation and the actual choice x1.
To compare (7) and (8), assume that outcomes are monetary payoffs in (7). If β1 > 0 and
u is linear (i.e., u(xi) = xi), (7) is a special case of (8) in which U(x, d) = α1x1+α2x2+β1d.
This linearity comes from again Independence. In (8), U is not uniquely identified. While
in (5), α and β1 are uniquely identified due to the the linearity of U , which makes (7)
incompatible with violations of IIA.
It can be shown that Weak Strategic Rationality II and the completeness of the pref-
erences imply one of the key axioms in Evren and Minardi (2014), Weak Instrumentalism.
That axiom is defined as follows: Let A,B,C ∈ A and suppose that C = A ∪ B. If there
exists a y ∈ A ∩B such that y1 ≥ x1 for every x ∈ C, then C ∼ A or C ∼ B.
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Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2001) primitive preferences are defined on the sets of lotteries,
not allocations of lotteries. In the following, in order to compare Gul and Pesendorfer’s
(2001) model and (7), we discuss the extended model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), in
which preferences are defined on the set of allocations of lotteries. By using several axioms,
including Independence, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) obtain the following model:
VGP (A) = max
p∈A
[
w(p) + v(p)−max
q∈A
v(q)
]
. (9)
If β1 = −1, (7) is a special case of (9) in which w(p) =
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) and v(p) = α1u(p1). In
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), w and v are unique up to positive affine transformation. In the
GU model, u is unique up to positive affine transformation and α and β1 are unique. The
additional structure that w(p) =
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) and v(p) = α1u(p1) mainly comes from Weak
Strategic Rationality II because the axiom implies that the temptation utility is the selfish
utility (i.e., v = α1u). This additional structure together with the richer domain in turn
makes it possible for us to uniquely identify the parameters (i.e., α, β1) in the GU model.
14To see this note that if y ∈ A ∩ B such that y1 ≥ x1 for every x ∈ C, then we obtain A,B ∈ A 1y .
Therefore, by Weak Strategic Rationality II, if A % B then A ∼ C; and if B % A then B ∼ C. Since % is
complete, A % B or B % A holds, hence C ∼ A or C ∼ B holds.
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6 Characterization of Parameters
Remember that in GU model, β1 can be positive or negative. If β1 is positive, then the
GU model captures the pride of acting altruistically; if β1 is negative, then the GU model
captures the temptation to act selfishly. In Section 6.1, we provide two axioms that identify
β1 ≤ 0 and β1 ≥ 0, respectively. In Section 6.2, we provide comparative statics on α1, β1,
and βS.
6.1 Pride and Temptation
The next axiom captures a decision maker’s temptation to act selfishly (i.e., the temptation
to maximize his own allocation). To minimize the cost of self-control, the decision maker
might prefer to commit a smaller set that does not contain an allocation that he will not
choose ex-post but that is superior (i.e., tempting) in his individual preference. We formalize
the axiom as follows:
Axiom (Temptation to Act Selfishly): For any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I ,


(i) q1 ≻1 p1
(ii) {p, q} ≻ {q}
(iii) pS ≻S qS

⇒ {p} % {p, q}.
By (i), q is better than p in the individual preference (i.e., q1 ≻1 p1). Moreover, (i) and
(ii) imply that p is better than q in the ex-post preference. To see this, note that even a
purely selfish agent, who maximizes %1, would not choose p. Hence, the act of not choosing
p cannot reveal the decision maker’s altruism. Thus, the decision maker will not experience
any feeling of pride from having (but not exercising) the option to choose p. Therefore,
the only one reason that the decision maker could prefer {p, q} to {q} as in (ii), is that he
prefers to choose p ex-post.
Moreover, by (iii), p is better than q in the social preference (i.e., pS ≻S qS). Thus the
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decision maker does not feel the shame of acting selfishly when he chooses p from {p, q}.
Hence, the decision maker prefers {p} to {p, q} only because of the cost of self-control of
not choosing the individually optimal allocation (i.e., q) from {p, q}.
In contrast, by not choosing such selfish allocations, a decision maker might feel pride in
acting altruistically. Hence, such a decision maker might prefer to have (but not exercise)
the option to choose the selfish allocations. This observation can be formalized as follows:
Axiom (Pride in Acting Altruistically): For any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I ,


(i) q1 ≻1 p1
(ii) {p, q} ≻ {q}
(iii) pS ≻S qS

⇒ {p, q} % {p}.
Proposition 2 Suppose that % is represented by the GU model with (u,α,β).
(i) % exhibits Temptation to Act Selfishly if and only if β1 ≤ 0,
(ii) % exhibits Pride in Acting Altruistically if and only if β1 ≥ 0.
6.2 Comparative Statics
By exploiting the strong uniqueness of the GU model, we can show that the value of each
parameter captures the degree of each phenomenon: α1 captures the level of selfishness (i.e.,
1/α1 captures the level of altruism). In contrast, β1 and βS capture the levels of pride seeking
(temptation aversion) and shame aversion, respectively.
Definition: For any preferences %X and %Y on A such that %Xi =%
Y
i for each i ∈ {1, S},
%X is more altruistic than %Y if the following is true: for any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I such that
pS ≻
i
S qS for each i ∈ {X, Y },
p %Yq⇒ p %Xq.
Note that in the definition above p is superior to q in the social preference (i.e., pS ≻
i
S qS).
Hence, if an agent (i.e., agent Y ) prefers p to q, then a more altruistic agent (i.e., agent X)
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also should prefer p to q.
Proposition 3 Suppose %X and %Y are represented respectively by two GU models with
(u,αX,βX) and (u,αY ,βY ) such that αXS = α
Y
S .
15 Then, X is more altruistic than Y if and
only if αX1 ≤ α
Y
1 .
Next, we investigate comparative statics on β1.
Definition: For preferences %X and %Y on A such that %X and %Y coincide on (∆(Z))I .
%X is more pride-seeking (less temptation-averse) than %Y , if the following is true: for any
p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and r ∈ ∆(Z) such that (i) q1 ≻
j
1 p1, (ii) {p, q} ≻
j {q}, and (iii) pS ≻
j
S qS
for each j ∈ {X, Y },
{p, q } %Y {(r)i∈I} ⇒ {p, q } %
X {(r)i∈I}.
As in the axiom of Pride of Acting Altruistically, the conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) mean
that p is ex-post superior to q; however, q is superior in the individual preference (i.e.,
q1 ≻
j
1 p1). Hence, by not choosing the selfish allocation q, an agent might feel pride in acting
altruistically. On the other hand, a singleton set {(r)i∈I} would not cause any psychological
effects. Therefore, if an agent (i.e., agent Y ) prefers {p, q } to a singleton set {(r)i∈I}, then
a more pride seeking (or a less temptation-averse) agent (i.e., agent X) also should prefer
{p, q } to {(r)i∈I}.
Next, we investigate comparative statics on βS.
Definition: For preferences %X and %Y on A such that %X and %Y coincide on (∆(Z))I .
%X is more shame-averse than %Y , if the following is true: for any p, q, r ∈ (∆(Z))I and
l ∈ ∆(Z) such that (i) qS ≻
j
S pS, (ii) r1 ≻
j
1 p1, and (iii) {p, q, r} ≻
j {q, r} for each
j ∈ {X, Y },
{(l)i∈I} %
Y {p, q } ⇒ {(l)i∈I } %
X {p, q }.
As in the axiom of Shame of Acting Selfishly, the conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) mean that
p is ex-post superior to q; however, q is socially superior to p (i.e., qS ≻
j
S pS). Hence, the
15Since %Xi =%
Y
i for all i ∈ {1, S}, there exist two GU models that share the same u and αS .
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agent would feel shame at choosing the socially inferior allocation p from {p, q}. Therefore,
if an agent (i.e., agent Y ) prefers a singleton set {(l)i∈I} to {p, q }, then a more shame averse
agent (i.e., agent X) also should prefer {(l)i∈I} to {p, q }.
Proposition 4 Suppose %X and %Y are represented respectively by two GU models with
(u,αX,βX) and (u,αY ,βY ) such that αX = αY .16 Then, the following statements hold:
(i) X is more pride-seeking (less temptation-averse) than Y if and only if βX1 ≥ β
Y
1 .
(ii) X is more shame-averse than Y if and only if βXS ≥ β
Y
S .
7 Ex-Post Choice
To model ex-post choice, we consider an additional primitive: for any set A ∈ A , let
C(A) ⊂ A be the non-empty set of all alternatives in A that the decision maker will choose
at the ex-post stage. Consider the following conditions. The first condition is the standard
condition proposed by Arrow (1959).
Axiom (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)): For all A,B ∈ A and p, q ∈
(∆(Z))I , if p ∈ C(A), q ∈ A, q ∈ C(B), and p ∈ B, then p ∈ C(B).
The second condition is also a standard continuity condition:
Axiom (Closed Graph): The set {(A,p)|A ∈ A ,p ∈ C(A)} is closed in A × (∆(Z))I .
The last condition is new, although a similar condition appears in Kopylov (2012).
Axiom (Consistency): For all p ∈ (∆(Z))I and A ∈ A ,
A ≻ A \ {p} ⇒ C(A) = {p} or A ∈ A 1p .
This condition requires that the decision maker does not prefer to remove an element p from
a set A only if he plans to choose p ex-post or if p is individually optimal in A. In the latter
16Since %X and %Y coincide on (∆(Z))I , there exist two GU models that share the same u and α.
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case, he could desire to have (but not exercise) the option to choose p in order to feel pride
of acting altruistically.
7.1 Representation
Proposition 5 Let % be represented by the GU model with (u,α,β). Then a choice corre-
spondence C(·) satisfies WARP, Closed Graph, and Consistency if and only if for all A ∈ A
C(A) = argmax
p∈A
(1− β1)α1u(p1) + (1 + βS)
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi).
If C(·) satisfies WARP, Closed Graph, and Consistency, then we call C(·) an ex-post choice
correspondence associated with %. We define U(p) ≡ (1− β)α1u(p1) + (1+ βS)
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)
for all p ∈ (∆(Z))I . We call U(·) the ex-post utility function.
Note that since β1 < 1, the function U is monotonic in the decision maker’s utility u(p1)
and the social utility
∑
i∈S αiu(pi). Hence, the decision maker will never derive utility from
decreasing his own utility (or social utility) unless it increases social utility (or his own utility,
respectively).
7.2 Impure Altruism and Impure Selfishness
We say that a decision maker exhibits impure altruism if he acts to benefit others’ allocations
because of pride in acting altruistically and shame of acting selfishly. Suppose that such a
decision maker, at the ex-ante private stage, is indifferent between two allocations and that
one of the allocations is ranked superior to the other allocation by his social preference
%S. Then at the ex-post public stage, the decision maker should strictly prefer the socially
superior allocation because the pride and the shame are triggered by the publicness of the
choice.
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Axiom (Impure Altruism): For all p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I ,
{p} ∼ {q} and pS ≻S qS ⇒ C({p, q}) = {p}.
Note that C({p, q}) = {p} implies that q 6∈ C({p, q}). Hence, the decision maker
strictly prefers the socially superior allocation p at the ex-post public stage, even though he
is indifferent between p and q at the ex-ante private stage.
In contrast, we say that a decision maker exhibits impure selfishness if the temptation
to act selfishly motivates him to diverge from his ex-ante choices. Suppose that such a
decision maker, at the ex-ante stage, is indifferent between two allocations and that one of
the allocations is ranked superior to the other allocation by his individual preference %1.
Then, the decision maker should strictly prefer the selfish allocation at the ex-post stage.
Axiom (Impure Selfishness): For all p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I ,
{p} ∼ {q} and p1 ≻1 q1 ⇒ C({p, q}) = {p}.
Proposition 6 Suppose that % is represented by the GU model with (u,α,β) and C(·) is
the ex-post choice correspondence associated with %. Then, the following statements hold:
(i) % exhibits Impure Altruism if and only if βS > −β1.
(ii) % exhibits Impure Selfishness if and only if βS < −β1.
To understand the above result intuitively, remember that in the GU model, the ex-ante
choices between allocations, say, between p and q , are formalized as choices between the
singleton sets, such as {p} and {q }. So at the ex-ante stage, the ex-ante choices maximize
V ({p}) = α1u(p1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(pi). On the other hand, as shown in Proposition 5, the ex-
post choices maximize U(p) ≡ (1 − β1)α1u(p1) + (1 + βS)
∑
i∈S αiu(pi). By comparing the
two functions, we can see that the decision maker’s choices become more altruistic (i.e., the
relative weight on uS becomes higher) at the ex-post stage than they are at the ex-ante stage
if and only if βS > −β1.
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8 Consistency with Experiments
In this section, we show that the special case of the GU model with β1 = 0 is consistent with
recent experimental evidence on dictator games with an exit option. Before describing the
evidence, we clarify the meaning of public in the experiments. We call a dictator’s choice
public if there is common knowledge among the subjects that they are playing a dictator
game, even though a receiver does not know the identity of his paired dictator. Given the
common knowledge, the dictator may consider the receiver’s wish that the dictator behaves
altruistically.17 Hence, the dictator could feel pride in acting altruistically by living up to the
receiver’s wish or shame from acting selfishly by denying that wish. (Indeed, in Appendix D
we observe that anonymity does not change major tendencies of choices in some experiments.)
In the experiments conducted by Dana et al. (2006), Broberg et al. (2007), and Lazear
et al. (2012), the exit option could be costly (in other words, playing the dictator game
is subsidized) but the option ensured that receivers never knew the choice of exit. So, by
using the exit option, dictators could consume the whole endowment (minus the cost of exit,
if any) and leave nothing to receivers–without feeling shame of acting selfishly.18 In these
experiments, about one-third of subjects used the exit option privately, but when the same
subjects played a standard dictator game without the exit option, they donated a positive
amount to the receivers.
Moreover, the most recent experiments conducted by Lazear et al. (2012) found that
both lower-level and higher-level donors decide to play the game, while the medium-level
donors exit. Hence, screening is important to implement higher-level donations.19 Other
experiments such as Dana et al. (2006) found consistent evidence for the tendency. (See
Figure 3 for this tendency and Appendix D for details.)
17Given the common knowledge, the dictator knows that the receiver knows that a dictator determines
the receiver’s allocation. Hence, the dictator would consider the receiver’s wish.
18An experimenter observed the choice of exit. This is consistent with our model because the experimenter
is an outside observer (i.e., the subjects’ choices should not affect the experimenter’s welfare).
19Notice that the low level donations minus the cost of subsidy can be negative. So the participation of
low-level donors can be costly.
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Figure 3: The relationship between donations and the choice of exit in Lazear et al. (2012)
(left) and Dana et al. (2006) (right). (In the left figure, each point shows the choice of each
subject. The curve is a smooth approximation of the choices. The right figure shows the
percentage of subjects who existed, depending on the proportions of their donations.)
The theory of inequality aversion such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Andreoni’s (1989,
1990) model of warm glow are inconsistent with this robust tendency to exit, not to mention
the above mentioned finding. In both theories, whether the dictator’s choice is private or
public does not make any difference in his utility. Moreover, by playing the dictator game,
the dictator can allocate the whole endowment and the subsidy arbitrarily between himself
and the receiver. Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012) can provide a sufficient condition for
the choice of exit: if the value of shame (i.e., the value of the function g) is large enough,
a subject should exit the game. In the following, by using the GU model, we will obtain
a necessary and sufficient condition for the choice of exit by using the unique parameters
(i.e., α and βS). Moreover, we show that our model can be consistent with the finding that
subjects whose donation is low or high tend to play the game, while subjects whose donation
is medium tend to exit the game.
To see that the GU model is consistent with the experimental evidence, note that the
singleton {(w, 0)} corresponds to exiting with endowment w; the set {(c, d) ∈ R2+|c + d ≤
w+τ} corresponds to playing the dictator game publicly with total endowment w+τ , where
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τ > 0 is the subsidy for playing the game (i.e., the cost of exiting the game). Hence, subjects
exit if and only if V ({(w, 0)}) ≥ V ({(c, d) ∈ R2+|c+ d ≤ w + τ}).
20 With the GU model, we
can characterize the choice of exit completely as follows:
Proposition 7 Suppose that u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, u(0) = 0, u′(0) = +∞, α1 > 0, β1 = 0,
βS ≥ 0, and τ > 0. Let βS ≡ u(τ)/(u(w + τ) − u(τ)). There exist real-valued functions
α1, α1 on [βS,+∞) such that
(i) given βS < βS, then the decision maker plays the game;
(ii) given βS ≥ βS, then the decision maker exits the game if and only if α1 ∈ [α1(βS), α1(βS)];
the decision maker plays the game if and only if α1 < α1(βS) or α1(βS) < α1.
Moreover, α1(βS) = α1(βS), α1 is a strictly decreasing, and α1 is a strictly increasing. Hence,
α1(βS) < α1(βS) for all βS > βS.
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Figure 4: The optimal choice (i.e., exit or play) depending on the parameters (i.e., α1 and βS).
The lower solid curve corresponds to the graph of α1. The upper dotted curve corresponds
to the graph of α1. Donation increases in the south-east direction (i.e., as α1 decreases and
βS increases).
The proposition says that if βS is lower than the bound βS ≡ u(τ)/(u(w + τ) − u(τ)),
20For simplicity, we assume that the decision maker exits if he is indifferent.
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then any subjects play the game because the shame which they anticipate in the game is
small.21 When βS is larger than the bound βS, (ii) implies that subjects whose α1 is low or
high tend to play the game, while subjects whose α1 is medium tend to exit the game. See
Figure 4 for an example.22
In the following, we discuss how this proposition captures the finding that subjects whose
donation is low or high tend to play the game, while subjects whose donation is medium
tend to exit the game. First, note that, given βS, donations increase as the index α1 of
selfishness decreases. Hence, given βS, the higher-level donors correspond to subjects whose
α1 is low; the medium-level donors correspond to subjects whose α1 is medium; and the
lower-level donors correspond to subjects whose α1 is high. So if βS and α1 are independently
distributed, the proposition captures the finding that both lower-level and higher-level donors
decide to play the game, while medium-level donors exit.
Given our purpose of separately capturing pure altruism and shame, there is no a prior
reason to assume a specific correlation. So, independence may be a sensible assumption.
Moreover, if we assume a specific correlation that βS is high when α1 is medium level, then
it is easy to describe the observed finding. One may think that α1 and βS would be negatively
correlated. That is, as a subject is more selfish (i.e., α1 is larger), he tends to be less shame-
averse (i.e., βS is smaller). However, such a negative correlation implies that lower donors
tend to play the game, which is incompatible with the observed finding. After all, how α1
and βS are distributed is an empirical question for future studies.
9 Application: Partial Crowding Out of Donations
In this section, we describe an empirical puzzle involving charitable donations: government
spending only partially crowds out consumers’ donations, even though standard consumer
theory predicts that the crowding out should be complete.
21Note that the since u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, the bound βS increases as τ increases. This means that given
βS , as τ increases, subjects more likely to play the game.
22In the figure, we assume that u(x) = − exp(−x) + 1, β1 = 0, w = 2, and τ = .5.
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In his well-known paper, Andreoni (1989, 1990) has proposed a model of warm glow and
obtained conditions that capture the puzzle. However, Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) model is not
axiomatic. Moreover, it is not easy to interpret his conditions that capture the puzzle: the
conditions are imposed on derivatives of the first-order conditions of the decision maker’s
maximization problem. In the following, we obtain simpler conditions on α and β that
capture the puzzle.
We consider the following two-period decision problem. Period 1 consists of ex-ante
private and ex-post public stages. At the ex-ante private stage, the decision maker divides
his income e between the savings s for Period 2 and the budget w for the ex-post public
stage. At the ex-post public stage, the decision maker divides his budget w between his
donation d and his consumption c. At Period 2, the decision maker consumes the savings s
privately. The two-period framework is adopted here for simplicity; the crucial assumption
here is that the decision maker can consume some of his income privately.
e: income
s: saving
w: budget
d: donation
c: consumption
Ex-ante Ex-post
Figure 5: Decision Making in Period 1
We assume that the decision maker’s preferences are separable across the two periods and
that his utility at each period is represented by the GU model. Then, for any time-discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and government spending g and tax τ , the decision maker’s problem at the
ex-ante stage of Period 1 is:
max
s,w
V ({(c, d+ g)|c+ d ≤ w − τ}) + δV ({(s, 0)}), (10)
subject to s+ w ≤ e.23 Given the optimal budget w∗(g, τ), the decision maker’s problem at
23Our results hold for any δ ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to axiomatize this extended representation (10) by
considering extended preferences %ˆ over A × (∆(Z))I . We could axiomatize this extended representation by
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the ex-post stage of Period 1 is:
max
d,c
U(c, d+ g), (11)
subject to d + c ≤ w∗(g, τ) − τ . We denote the optimal donation (i.e., the solution d to
(11)) by d∗(g, τ). We say that the decision maker’s donation is crowded out completely if
d∗(g, τ) + g is constant in g and that his donation is crowded out partially if d∗(g, τ) + g is
strictly increasing in g.
Proposition 8 Suppose that (a) government spending is financed by tax (i.e., g = τ) and
(b) u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, u′′′ ≥ 0, u′(0) = +∞, and α1 ≥ 1. Then, the following holds:
(i) if the decision maker’s index (i.e., β1) for pride is larger than his index (i.e., βS) of
shame, then his donation is crowded out partially.
(ii) if he does not exhibit pride, shame, and temptation (i.e., β1 = 0 = βS), then his
donation is crowded out completely.
To see the result intuitively, note that V ({(c, d+ g)|c+ d ≤ w− τ}) = (1− β1)α1u(c
∗) +
(1+ βS)u(d
∗) + β1α1(u(w− τ)− u(c
∗))− βS(u(w)− u(d
∗)), where c∗ and d∗ are the optimal
consumption and the optimal donation respectively.24 Under the assumption that α1 ≥ 1, if
β1 > βS, then β1α1 > βS. Hence, the net effect β1α1(u(w − τ)− u(c
∗))− βS(u(w)− u(d
∗))
caused by pride and shame is increasing in w.25 Therefore, when τ increases, the decision
maker would increase w to compensate this increase of τ . This increase of w maintains the
level of donations, which implies that the crowding out will be only partial.
assuming that the conditional preference of %ˆ on A satisfies our axioms in the theorem as well as standard
conditions, including the Independence axiom on A × (∆(Z))I .
24In the equation, the disutility of the shame is −βS(u(w+ g− τ)− u(d∗)), which is equal to −βS(u(w)−
u(d∗)) because g = τ .
25By the envelope theorem, the derivative of the difference is β1α1u
′(w− τ)− βSu′(w). By the concavity,
u′(w − τ) > u′(w). Hence, the derivative of the difference is positive because β1α1 > βS .
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A Proof of Theorem
In this section, we prove the theorem. First, we show the sufficiency part of the theorem.
Fix % that satisfies the axioms in the theorem. The next lemma provides representations
for %1 and %S.
Lemma 1 There exist a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u1 on ∆(Z) and positive
numbers {αi}i∈S such that (i) u1 represents %1 on ∆(Z), (ii) there exist z, z ∈ Z such that
u1(z) = 1 ≥ u1(p) ≥ 0 = u1(z) for all p ∈ ∆(Z), and (iii) uS ≡
∑
i∈S αiu1 represents %S
and
∑
i∈S αi = 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: First, we show that %1 is well defined (i.e., if (l1, pS) % (r1, pS) for some
pS ∈ (∆(Z))
S, then (l1, qS) % (r1, qS) for all qS ∈ (∆(Z))
S). Suppose by way of contradiction
that (l1, pS) % (r1, pS) and (l1, qS) ≺ (r1, qS). By Independence, (l1,
1
2
pS +
1
2
qS) % (
1
2
r1 +
1
2
l1,
1
2
pS +
1
2
qS) and (l1,
1
2
qS +
1
2
pS) ≺ (
1
2
r1 +
1
2
l1,
1
2
qS +
1
2
pS). This is a contradiction. By the
same way, we can show that %S is well defined.
To show %1 satisfies Independence, fix p1, q1, l1 ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for any
pS, qS ∈ ∆(Z), p1 %1 q1 ⇔ (p1, pS) % (q1, pS)⇔ α(p1, pS) + (1−α)(l1, qS) % α(q1, pS) + (1−
α)(l1, qS)⇔ αp1+(1−α)l1 %1 αq1+(1−α)l1. By the same way, we can show that %S satisfies
Independence. Then, by the standard argument with von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Theorem,
there exist mixture-linear utility functions u1 and uˆS, which are unique up to positive affine
transformation. Then, (ii) follows from the finiteness of Z and a normalization. Finally,
by Consistency, it follows from Fishburn (1984) that there exist a positive numbers {αi}i∈S
and a real number γ such that uˆS(pS) =
∑
i∈S αiu1(pi) + γ and
∑
i∈S αi = 1. By defining
uS = uˆS − γ, we obtain (iii). 
The next lemma shows a stronger version of Dominance.
Lemma 2 For any set A,B ∈ A , if for any p ∈ B, there exists q ∈ A such that q1 %1 p1
and qS %S pS, then A ∼ A ∪ B.
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Proof of Lemma 2: Fix A,B ∈ A . Since ∆(Z) is separable, there exists a countable set
B′ = {p1,p2,p3, . . . } such that cl.B′ = B. Let B0 = ∅ and Bn = {p
1, . . . ,pn}, so that
Bn ⊂ Bn+1 for all n and B
′ = ∪∞n=1Bn. Then, Bn → cl.B
′ = B in the Hausdorff metric
topology.26 Since for any pn, there exists q ∈ A such that q1 %1 p
n
1 and qS %S p
n
S. Then,
by Dominance, A ∪ Bn ≡ (A ∪ Bn−1) ∪ p
n ∼ A ∪ Bn−1. By transitivity, A ∪ Bn ∼ A for all
n ∈ N. By continuity, hence, A ∪ B ∼ A. 
For all A ∈ A , define u(A) = {(u1(p1),
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)) ∈ R
2|p ≡ (p1, pS) ∈ A} and A
∗ =
{u(A)|A ∈ A }. Since A ∈ A is closed, u(A) is also closed by the continuity of u1 and uS.
Since u1(∆(Z)) = [0, 1] and uS((∆(Z))
S) = [0, 1], A ∗ is a set of compact subsets of [0, 1]2. We
endow A ∗ with the Hausdorff metric dh(A
∗, B∗) = max{maxu∈A∗ minv∈B∗ d(u, v ),maxu∈B∗
minv∈A∗ d(u, v )}, where d is the Euclidean metric. We define a mixture on A
∗ as follows: for
all A∗, B∗ ∈ A ∗ and α ∈ [0, 1], αA∗+ (1−α)B∗ = {u ∈ R2|u = αv+ (1−α)w for some v ∈
A∗,w ∈ B∗}. Define %∗ on A ∗ as follows:
A∗ %∗ B∗ if A % B,
where u(A) = A∗ and u(B) = B∗. Define ≻∗ and ∼∗ as the asymmetric and symmetric
parts of %∗, respectively.
Lemma 2 shows that %∗ is well defined in the following sense:
Lemma 3 If A∗ = B∗, then A ∼ B.
Proof of Lemma 3: If u(A) = u(B), then for any p ∈ A there exists q ∈ B such that
q1 ∼1 p1 and qS ∼S pS. Therefore, Lemma 2 shows that A ∼ A ∪ B. In the same way, we
can show B ∼ A ∪B. Hence, A ∼ B. 
Next lemma shows that %∗ satisfies the following axioms.
Axiom (Independence*): For all α ∈ [0, 1] and A∗, B∗, C∗ ∈ A ∗, A∗ %∗ B∗ if and only if
αA∗ + (1− α)C∗ %∗ αB∗ + (1− α)C∗.
26cl.A denotes the closure of A for all A ∈ A .
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Axiom: (Pareto*) For any u, v ∈ [0, 1]2, if u1 ≥ v1 and uS ≥ vS, then u %
∗ v. Moreover if
u1 > v1 or uS > vS, then u ≻
∗ v.
Axiom: (Dominance*) For any A ∈ A and u ∈ [0, 1]2, if there exists v ∈ A∗ such that
v1 ≥ u1 and vS ≥ uS, then A
∗ ∼∗ A∗ ∪ {u}.
Axiom: (Weak Strategic Rationality*) If there exist u, v ∈ A∗ and u′, v′ ∈ B∗ such that for
all w ∈ A∗ ∪ B∗, u1 = u
′
1 ≥ w1 and vS = v
′
S ≥ wS, then A
∗ %∗ B∗ ⇒ A∗ ∪B∗ ∼∗ A∗.
Axiom: (Shame of Acting Selfishly*) If (i) vS > uS, (ii) w1 > u1, and (iii) {u, v,w} ≻
∗
{v,w}, then {u} %∗ {u, v}.
Lemma 4 %∗ is a complete, transitive, and continuous binary relation that satisfies Inde-
pendence*, Pareto*, Dominance*, Weak Strategic Rationality*, and Shame of Acting Self-
ishly*.
Proof of Lemma 4: Remember that % is a complete and transitive binary relation that
satisfies Independence, Pareto, Dominance, Weak Strategic Rationality, and Shame of Acting
Selfishly. Hence, by the definition of %∗, %∗ also satisfies those properties. In the following,
we show that %∗ is continuous. Choose any A∗ ∈ A ∗ to show {B∗ ∈ A ∗|B∗ %∗ A∗} and
{B∗ ∈ A ∗|A∗ % B∗} are closed.
Let {B∗n} be a sequence such that B
∗
n %
∗ A∗ and B∗n → B
∗ to show B∗ %∗ A∗. By
definition, there exists a sequence {Bn} such that u(Bn) = B
∗
n and Bn % A. Since Bn ∈ A
and A is compact, there exists a convergent subsequence {B′k} such that B
′
k → B
′. Since
B′k % A for all k, then the continuity of % shows that B
′ % A. Since u is continuous, then
u(B′k) → u(B
′). Since {u(B′k)} is a subsequence of {B
∗
n} and B
∗
n → B
∗, it must hold that
u(B′) = B∗. Since B′ % A, we obtain B∗ %∗ A∗. In the same way, we can show that
{B∗ ∈ A ∗|A∗ %∗ B∗} is closed. 
Now, we show a general representation for %∗.
Lemma 5 There exists a function µ : R → R such that V ∗(A∗) =
∑
λ∈R
(
maxu∈A∗ λu1 +
(1− λ)uS
)
µ(λ) represents %∗. Moreover, supp(µ) ≡ {λ ∈ R|µ(λ) 6= 0} is finite.
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Proof of Lemma 5:
Step 1: (i) There exist finite sets K and L of functions on [0, 1]2 such that %∗ is represented
by V ∗(A∗) =
∑
U∈K maxu∈A∗ U(u )−
∑
U∈Lmaxu∈A∗ U(u ), (ii) For any U ∈ K∪L, λ ∈ [0, 1],
and u, v ∈ [0, 1]2, U(λu + (1− λ)v) = λU(u) + (1− λ)U(v), (iii) For any U ∈ K ∪ L, there
exist no U ′ ∈ K ∪ L \ {U}, a > 0, and b ∈ R such that U = aU ′ + b.
Proof of Step 1: By Lemma 4, %∗ is a continuous, complete, and transitive relation that
satisfies Independence*. To show Step 1, by Kopylov (2009, Theorem 2.1), it suffices to
show that %∗ satisfies his Finiteness axiom, that is, for any sequence {A∗n} of A
∗ there
exists a positive integer N such that
⋃N
n=1A
∗
n ∼
∗
⋃N+1
n=1 A
∗
n.
27 To show that %∗ satisfies
this axiom, choose any A∗1, A
∗
2, A
∗
3, A
∗
4 ∈ A
∗. Let u∗ = argmaxu∈A∗
1
∪A∗
2
∪A∗
3
∪A∗
4
u1 and v
∗ =
argmaxv∈A∗
1
∪A∗
2
∪A∗
3
∪A∗
4
vS. (Such u
∗ and v∗ exist because each A∗i is compact.) Without loss
of generality, assume u∗ ∈ A∗1, v
∗ ∈ A∗2, and A
∗
1 ∪ A
∗
2 ∪ A
∗
3 %
∗ A∗1 ∪ A
∗
2 ∪ A
∗
4. Since u
∗ ∈ A∗1
and v∗ ∈ A∗2, Weak Strategic Rationality* shows that A
∗
1 ∪ A
∗
2 ∪ A
∗
3 ∪ A
∗
4 ∼
∗ A∗1 ∪ A
∗
2 ∪ A
∗
3.
So Finiteness is satisfied with N = 3. 
Normalize each U ∈ K ∪ L by adding a constant number so as to obtain U(0, 0) = 0.
Step 2: For all U ∈ K ∪ L, there exists (a1(U), aS(U)) ∈ R
2 such that U(u ) = a1(U)u1 +
aS(U)uS. Moreover, for any U, U
′ ∈ K ∪ L such that U 6= U ′, a1(U)
a1(U)+aS(U)
6= a1(U
′)
a1(U ′)+aS(U ′)
.
Proof of Step 2: For all U ∈ K ∪ L, define a1(U) = U(1, 0) and aS(U) = U(0, 1). Fix
u ≡ (u1, uS) ∈ [0, 1]
2. Consider the case where u1 + uS ≥ 1. Then,
1
u1+uS
U(u1, uS) + (1 −
1
u1+uS
)U(0, 0) = U
(
u1
u1+uS
, uS
u1+uS
)
= u1
u1+uS
U(1, 0)+ uS
u1+uS
U(0, 1) = 1
u1+uS
(a1(U)u1+aS(U)uS).
Since U(0, 0) = 0, then U(u) = a1(U)u1 + aS(U)uS. The other case where u1 + uS ≤ 1 can
be proved in the same way. Step 1 (iii) shows that for any U, U ′ ∈ K ∪ L such that U 6= U ′,
a1(U)
a1(U)+aS (U)
6= a1(U
′)
a1(U ′)+aS(U ′)
. 
27Kopylov (2009, Theorem 2.1) shows that Step 1 holds if and only if %∗ is a continuous, complete, and
transitive relation that satisfies Independence and Finiteness.
40
For all λ ∈ R define
µ(λ) =


a1 + aS if λ =
a1(U)
a1(U)+aS (U)
for some U ∈ K,
−(a1 + aS) if λ =
a1(U)
a1(U)+aS(U)
for some U ∈ L,
0 otherwise.
Note that µ is well defined because for any U, U ′ ∈ K ∪ L such that U 6= U ′, a1(U)
a1(U)+aS (U)
6=
a1(U ′)
a1(U ′)+aS(U ′)
. Therefore, by Step 1 and Step 2, we establish Lemma 5. Moreover, since K
and L are finite, supp(µ) is finite. 
Fix ε < 1
2
. For all λ ∈ R, define
u∗1(λ) =
1
2
+
ελ
‖(λ, 1− λ)‖
, u∗S(λ) =
1
2
+
ε(1− λ)
‖(λ, 1− λ)‖
, and u∗(λ) = (u∗1(λ), u
∗
S(λ)).
Then u∗(λ) is on the boundary of Bε(
1
2
, 1
2
) (i.e., the closed ball with radius ε centered at
(1
2
, 1
2
)). The next lemma is useful to characterize V .
Lemma 6 (i) For all λ, λ′ ∈ R such that λ 6= λ′, λu∗1(λ) + (1 − λ)u
∗
S(λ) > λu
∗
1(λ
′) + (1 −
λ)u∗S(λ
′). (ii) For all λ ∈ [0, 1], u∗1(1) ≥ u
∗
1(λ) and u
∗
S(0) ≥ u
∗
S(λ). (iii) If λ 6∈ [0, 1],
u∗1(
|λ|
|λ|+|1−λ|
) ≥ u∗1(λ) and u
∗
S(
|λ|
|λ|+|1−λ|
) ≥ u∗S(λ).
Proof of Lemma 6: To show (i), choose any u ∈ Bε(
1
2
, 1
2
) and any λ ∈ R. Then, λu∗1(λ) +
(1−λ)u∗S(λ) =
1
2
+ε‖(λ, 1−λ)‖ ≥ 1
2
+‖u−(1
2
, 1
2
)‖‖(λ, 1−λ)‖ ≥ 1
2
+ |(u−(1
2
, 1
2
)) ·(λ, 1−λ)| =
|λu1+(1−λ)uS| ≥ λu1+(1−λ)uS, where the first inequality holds because u ∈ Bε(
1
2
, 1
2
) and
the second inequality holds by Cauchy-Scharz’s inequality. The two inequalities hold with
equalities if and only if u− (1
2
, 1
2
) = ε
‖(λ,1−λ)‖
(λ, 1− λ), or u = u∗(λ). Since u∗(λ) = u∗(µ) if
and only if λ = µ, (i) holds. (ii) and (iii) follow from direct calculations.28 
28(ii) holds because u∗1(1) =
1
2 + ε ≥ u
∗
1(λ) and u
∗
S(0) =
1
2 + ε ≥ u
∗
S(λ) for all λ ∈ R. To see (iii) holds,
consider the case where λ < 0. Then |λ||λ|+|1−λ| ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, u1(
|λ|
|λ|+|1−λ| ) ≥
1
2 > u1(λ). Moreover, by a
direct calculation, uS(
|λ|
|λ|+|1−λ| ) =
1
2 +
ε|1−λ|
‖(λ,1−λ)‖ = uS(λ) because 1 − λ > 0. The other case where λ > 1
can be proved in the same way.
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Lemma 7 There exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that µ(λ∗) > 0 and V ∗(A∗) = µ(1)maxu∈A∗ u1 +
µ(λ∗)maxu∈A∗(λ
∗u1 + (1− λ
∗)uS) + µ(0)maxu∈A∗ uS.
Proof of Lemma 7: Given Lemma 5, it suffices to show the following: (i) For any λ 6∈ [0, 1],
then µ(λ) = 0; (ii) For any λ 6∈ {0, 1}, µ(λ) ≥ 0; (iii) There exists unique λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that µ(λ∗) > 0.
To show (i), suppose by way of contradiction that there exists λ′ 6∈ [0, 1] such that µ(λ′) 6=
0. Define A∗ =
{
u∗(λ) ∈ R2
∣∣λ ∈ {0, 1, |λ′|
|λ′|+|1−λ′|
}
∪ supp(µ) \ {λ′}
}
. Since supp(µ) is finite,
both A∗ and A∗∪u∗(λ′) are closed. Therefore, V ∗(A∗) and V ∗(A∗∪u∗(λ′)) are well defined.
Since u∗( |λ
′|
|λ′|+|1−λ′|
) ∈ A∗, Lemma 6 (iii) and Dominance* show that A∗∼∗A∗ ∪ u∗(λ′), so
that V ∗(A∗) = V ∗(A∗ ∪ u∗(λ′)).
However, for all λ ∈
{
0, 1, |λ
′|
|λ′|+|1−λ′|
}
∪supp(µ)\{λ′}, Lemma 6 (i) shows that maxu∈A∗∪u∗(λ′) λu1+
(1 − λ)uS = λu
∗
1(λ) + (1 − λ)u
∗
S(λ) = maxu∈A∗ λu1 + (1 − λ)uS. Moreover, by (i) again,
maxu∈A∗∪u∗(λ′) λ
′u1+(1−λ
′)uS = λ
′u∗1(λ
′)+(1−λ′)u∗S(λ
′) > maxu∈A∗ λ
′
1u1+(1−λ
′)uS. There-
fore, V ∗(A∗∪u∗(λ′))−V ∗(A∗) =
(
λ′u∗1(λ
′)+(1−λ′)u∗S(λ
′)−maxu∈A∗ λ
′
1u1+(1−λ
′)uS
)
µ(λ′) 6=
0 because µ(λ′) 6= 0. This is a contradiction. Hence, (i) holds.
To show (ii), suppose by way of contradiction that there exists ξ 6∈ {0, 1} such that
µ(ξ) < 0. Define A∗ = {u∗(λ)|λ ∈ {0, 1} ∪ supp(µ) \ {ξ}}. Since supp(µ) is finite, A∗ is
closed. Hence, A∗ ∈ A ∗. By Lemma 6 (i), V (A∗∪u∗(ξ))−V (A∗) =
(
maxu∈A∗∪u∗(ξ)(ξu1+(1−
ξ)uS)−maxu∈A∗(ξu1+(1−ξ)uS)
)
µ(ξ) < 0. Hence, A∗ ≻∗ A∗∪u∗(ξ). Since u∗(1),u∗(0) ∈ A∗,
it follows from Lemma 6 (ii) that u∗1(1) ≥ w1 and u
∗
S(0) ≥ wS for all w ∈ A
∗ ∪ u∗(ξ). By
Weak Strategic Rationality*, we obtain A∗ ∼∗ A∗ ∪ A∗ ∪ u∗(ξ) = A∗ ∪ u∗(ξ), which is a
contradiction.
To show (iii), first we show that there exists at most one λ 6∈ {0, 1} such that µ(λ) > 0.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist distinct elements ξ, η 6∈ {0, 1} such that
µ(ξ) > 0 and µ(η) > 0. Define A∗ = {u∗(λ)|λ ∈ {0, 1}∪supp(µ)\{ξ}} and B∗ = {u∗(λ)|λ ∈
{0, 1} ∪ supp(µ) \ {η}}. Since supp(µ) is finite, A∗ and B∗ are closed. Hence, A∗, B∗ ∈ A ∗.
Note that u∗(1) ∈ A∗ ∩ B∗ and u∗(0) ∈ A∗ ∩ B∗. Hence, Lemma 6 (ii) and Weak Strategic
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Rationality* imply that if A∗ %∗ B∗, then A∗ ∪ B∗ ∼∗ A∗; and that if B∗ %∗ A∗, then
A∗ ∪ B∗ ∼∗ B∗. Since %∗ is a weak order, either A∗ ∪ B∗ ∼∗ A∗ or A∗ ∪ B∗ ∼∗ B∗
holds. However, by Lemma 6 (i), V (A∗ ∪ B∗) − V (B∗) =
(
maxu∈A∗∪B∗ ηu1 + (1 − η)uS −
maxu∈A∗(ηu1 + (1 − η)uS)
)
µ(η) > 0 and V (A∗ ∪ B∗) − V (A∗) =
(
maxu∈A∗∪B∗ ξu1 + (1 −
ξ)uS −maxu∈B∗(ξu1 + (1− ξ)uS)
)
µ(ξ) > 0. This is a contradiction.
Next we show that there exists at least one λ 6∈ {0, 1} such that µ(λ) > 0. Suppose not.
Then, by (i) and (ii), µ(λ) = 0 for all λ 6∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, V ∗(u ) = µ(1)u1 + µ(0)uS for
all u ∈ [0, 1]2. Since % satisfies Pareto*, it must hold that µ(1) > 0 and µ(0) > 0. However,
this representation contradicts with Shame of Acting Selfishly*. To see this note that if (i)
vS > uS, (ii) w1 > u1, and (iii) {u, v,w} ≻
∗ {v,w}, then V ∗({u}) = µ(1)u1 + µ(0)uS <
µ(1)max{u1, v1}+ µ(0)vS = V
∗({u, v}). 
Lemma 8 µ(0) ≤ 0.
Proof of Lemma 8: Choose v,w ∈ [0, 1]2 such that w1 > v1 and vS > wS. Let u ∈ [0, 1]
2
be such that w1 > u1 > v1 and vS > uS > wS. By making u1 and uS close enough to w1 and
vS respectively, we can obtain λ
∗u1+(1−λ
∗)uS > max{λ
∗v1+(1−λ
∗)vS, λ
∗w1+(1−λ
∗)wS}
because λ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Since µ(λ∗) > 0, it follows that V ∗({u, v,w}) > V ∗({v,w}). Therefore,
Shame of Acting Selfishly* requires that V ∗({u}) ≥ V ∗({u, v}). Hence, 0 ≤ V ∗({u}) −
V ∗({u, v}) = µ(0)[uS − vS]. Since vS > uS, we obtain µ(0) ≤ 0. 
By Lemma 7, for all u ∈ [0, 1]2, V ∗(u ) = (µ(λ∗)λ∗+ µ(1))u1 + (µ(λ
∗)(1− λ∗) + µ(0))uS.
Normalize µ so as to hold µ(λ∗)(1− λ∗) +µ(0) = 1. By Pareto*, µ(λ∗)λ∗+µ(1) > 0. Define
α1 = µ(λ
∗)λ∗ + µ(1), β1 =
µ(1)
µ(λ∗)λ∗ + µ(1)
, and βS = −µ(0).
Then, α1 > 0. Since λ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) and µ(λ∗) > 0, we obtain β1 < 1. Since µ(0) ≤ 0, we obtain,
βS ≥ 0. By the normalization and the definitions, µ(1) = β1α1, µ(λ
∗)λ∗ = (µ(λ∗)λ∗ +
µ(1))
(
1− µ(1)
µ(λ∗)λ∗+µ(1)
)
= α1(1−β1), and µ(λ
∗)(1−λ∗) = 1−µ(0) = 1+βS. Hence, by Lemma
7, we obtain V ∗(A∗) = maxu∈A∗
(
(1−β1)α1u1+(1+βS)uS
)
+β1α1maxu∈A∗ u1−βS maxu∈A∗ uS.
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For all A ∈ A , define V (A) = V ∗(A∗). Then, A % B ⇔ A∗ %∗ B∗ ⇔ V ∗(A∗) ≥
V ∗(B∗)⇔ V (A) ≥ V (B). Hence, V represents %. By arranging the terms and substituting
u1 = u(p1) and uS =
∑
i∈S αiu(pi), we obtain the GU model.
Finally, we show the necessity. We show that the representation satisfies Weak Strategic
Rationality and Shame of Acting Selfishly. It is easy to see the necessity of the other axioms.
To show Weak Strategic Rationality, consider p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and A,B ∈ A 1p ∩ A
S
q
such that A % B. Then, 0 ≤ V (A) − V (B) = maxp′∈A U(p
′) − maxp′∈B U(p
′). Hence,
maxp′∈A U(p
′) ≥ maxp′∈B U(p
′), so that maxp′∈A∪B U(p
′) = maxp′∈A U(p
′). It follows that
V (A ∪B)− V (A) = maxp′∈A∪B U(p
′)−maxp′∈A U(p
′) = 0.
To show Shame of Acting Selfishly, suppose qS ≻S pS, r1 ≻1 p1, and {p, q, r} ≻ {q, r}.
Then, 0 < V ({p, q, r}) − V ({q, r}) = maxp′∈{p,q,r} U(p
′) − maxp′∈{q,r} U(p
′). It follows
that U(p) > U(q). Since qS ≻S pS, we have p1 ≻1 q1. Hence, V ({p}) − V ({p, q}) =
βS[
∑
i∈S αiu(qi)−
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)] ≥ 0, so that {p} % {p, q}.
B Proof of Corollaries and Propositions
In the following, for any p ∈ ∆(Z), we denote by (p)i∈S an allocation over the other agents
(i.e., over the set S) that yields p for each i ∈ S.
Proof of Corollary 1: Note that Weak Strategic Rationality I implies Weak Strategic
Rationality. So all of the axioms in Theorem are satisfied. Hence, we can show Lemma 1–8
in the proof of Theorem. So, there exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that µ(λ∗) > 0 and V ∗(A∗) =
µ(1)maxu∈A∗ u1+µ(λ
∗)maxu∈A∗(λ
∗u1+(1−λ
∗)uS)+µ(0)maxu∈A∗ uS and µ(0) ≤ 0. Finally,
we show that µ(1) = 0. To see this note that choose v,w ∈ [0, 1]2 such that w1 > v1 and
vS > wS. Let u ∈ [0, 1]
2 be such that w1 > u1 > v1 and vS > uS > wS. By making u1 and
uS close enough to w1 and vS respectively, we can obtain λ
∗u1 + (1 − λ
∗)uS > max{λ
∗v1 +
(1 − λ∗)vS, λ
∗w1 + (1 − λ
∗)wS} because λ
∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then, V ∗({u, v}) − V ∗({v,w}) =
µ(1)u1+µ(λ
∗)(λ∗u1+(1−λ
∗)uS)+µ(0)vS−
[
µ(1)w1+µ(λ
∗)max{λ∗v1+(1−λ
∗)vS, λ
∗w1+
(1 − λ∗)wS} + µ(0)vS
]
= µ(1)(u1 − w1) + µ(λ
∗)
(
λ∗u1 + (1 − λ
∗)uS − max{λ
∗v1 + (1 −
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λ∗)vS, λ
∗w1+(1−λ
∗)wS}
)
. When u1 and uS are close enough to w1 and vS respectively, we
have V ∗({u, v})−V ∗({v,w}) > 0, so that {u, v} ≻ {v,w}. Since {u, v}, {v,w} ∈ A Sv , Weak
Strategic Rationality I shows that {u, v} ∼ {u, v,w}, so that V ∗({u, v}) = V ∗({u, v,w}).
Since w1 > v1, vS > wS, and λ
∗u1+(1−λ
∗)uS > max{λ
∗v1+(1−λ
∗)vS, λ
∗w1+(1−λ
∗)wS},
we obtain V ∗({u, v,w}) − V ∗({u, v}) = µ(1)(w1 − v1), so that µ(1)(w1 − v1) = 0. Since
w1 − v1 > 0, it follows that µ(1) = 0.
Proof of Corollary 2: Note that Weak Strategic Rationality II implies Weak Strategic
Rationality. Hence, by using No Shame of Acting Selfishly, we can show Lemma 1–7 hold.
Therefore, there exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that µ(λ∗) > 0 and V ∗(A∗) = µ(1)maxu∈A∗ u1 +
µ(λ∗)maxu∈A∗(λ
∗u1 + (1 − λ
∗)uS) + µ(0)maxu∈A∗ uS. Finally, we show that µ(0) = 0. To
see this note that choose v,w ∈ [0, 1]2 such that w1 > v1 and vS > wS. Let u ∈ [0, 1]
2 be
such that w1 > u1 > v1 and vS > uS > wS. By making u1 and uS close enough to w1 and vS
respectively, we can obtain λ∗u1 + (1− λ
∗)uS > max{λ
∗v1 + (1− λ
∗)vS, λ
∗w1 + (1− λ
∗)wS}
because λ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then, V ∗({u,w})− V ∗({v,w}) = µ(1)w1 + µ(λ
∗)(λ∗u1 + (1− λ
∗)uS) +
µ(0)uS−
[
µ(1)w1+µ(λ
∗)max{λ∗v1+(1−λ
∗)vS, λ
∗w1+(1−λ
∗)wS}+µ(0)vS
]
= µ(λ∗)
(
λ∗u1+
(1 − λ∗)uS − max{λ
∗v1 + (1 − λ
∗)vS, λ
∗w1 + (1 − λ
∗)wS}
)
− µ(0)(vS − uS). When u1 and
uS are close enough to w1 and vS respectively, we have V
∗({u,w}) − V ∗({v,w}) > 0, so
that {u,w} ≻ {v,w}. Since {u,w}, {v,w} ∈ A 1w , Weak Strategic Rationality II shows that
{u,w} ∼ {u, v,w}, so that V ∗({u,w}) = V ∗({u, v,w}). Since w1 > v1, vS > wS, and
λ∗u1 + (1− λ
∗)uS > max{λ
∗v1 + (1− λ
∗)vS, λ
∗w1 + (1− λ
∗)wS}, we obtain V
∗({u, v,w})−
V ∗({u,w}) = µ(0)(vS − uS), so that µ(0)(vS − uS) = 0. Since vS − uS > 0, it follows that
µ(0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: By the standard uniqueness result on (∆(Z))I and the normal-
ization (i.e.,
∑
i∈S αi = 1), αi = α
′
i for all i ∈ I and u = au
′ + b for some real numbers
a > 0 and b. By the nondegeneracy, z ≻ z for some z, z ∈ Z. Normalize u such that
u(z) = 1 and u(z) = −1. For all x ∈ [0, 1] define p(x) = xδz + (1 − x)
(
1
2
δz +
1
2
δz
)
∈ ∆(Z),
pS(x) = (p(x))i∈S, and p(x) = (p(x), pS(x)). Then, u(p(x)) = x and
∑
i∈S αiu(p(x)) = x.
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Now, we show β1 = β
′
1. Since 1 − β1 > 0, 1 + βS > 0, α1 > 0, and αi > 0 for some
i ∈ S, then for all a ∈ [0, 1], there exists εa ∈ [0, a) such that (1 − β1)α1εa + (1 + βS)εa =
(1− β1)α1a. Since u(p(x)) = x = uS(pS(x)) for all x ∈ [0, 1], then (1− β1)α1u
(
p(εa)
)
+ (1+
βS)uS
(
pS(εa)
)
= (1− β1)α1u(p(a)) + (1 + βS)
∑
i∈S αiu(p(0)).
For all a ∈ [0, 1], define g(a) = V
({
p(εa),
(
p(a), pS(0)
)})
. Since
∑
i∈S αi = 1, we have∑
i∈S αiu(p(a)) = u(p(a)). Hence, g(a) = (1 − β1)α1u(p(εa)) + (1 + βS)
∑
i∈S αiu(p(εa)) +
β1α1u(p(a))− βS
∑
i∈S αiu(p(εa)) = (α1 + 1)u(p(εa)) + β1α1(u(p(a))− u(p(εa))).
Since ε0 = 0, then g(0) = V (p(0)). Since g is continuous and V (z) > g(0) > V (z), there
exists a positive number a such that V (z) > g(a) > V (z), so that z ≻
{
p(εa),
(
p(a), pS(0)
)}
≻ z. By the continuity, there exists η ∈ [0, 1] such that ηδz+(1−η)δz ∼
{
p(εa),
(
p(a), pS(0)
)}
.
To make notation simple, let r = ηδz + (1− η)δz.
Since α1u(r)+
∑
i∈S αiu(r) = (α1+1)u(r), it follows that (α1+1)u(p(εa))+β1α1(u(p(a))−
u(p(εa))) = g(a) = (α1+1)u(r). Since u(p(a))−u(p(εa)) 6= 0, we obtain β1 =
(α1+1)(u(r)−u(p(εa))
α1(u(p(a))−u(p(εa)))
=
(α′
1
+1)(u′(r)−u′(p(εa))
α′
1
(u′(p(a))−u′(p(εa)))
= β ′1, where the equality holds because αi = α
′
i and u = au
′ + b for some
a > 0 and b ∈ R.
Next, we show βS = β
′
S. Since 1−β1 > 0, 1+βS > 0, and αi > 0 for some i ∈ I, then for
all a ∈ [0, 1], there exists ξa ∈ [0, a) such that (1−β1)α1u(p(ξa))+(1+βS)
∑
i∈S αiu(p(ξa))) =
(1−β1)α1u(p(0))+(1+βS)
∑
i∈S αiu(p(a)). Given this ξ, we can show βS = β
′
S by considering{
(p(ξa), (p(0), pS(a))
}
, instead of
{
p(εa),
(
p(a), pS(0)
)}
, in the same way of proving β1 = β
′
1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that q1 ≻1 p1, {p, q} ≻ {q}, and pS ≻S qS. Then, 0 <
V ({p, q})−V (q) = (max{U(p), U(q)}+β1α1u(q1)−βS
∑
i∈S αiu(pi))− (U(q)+β1α1u(q1)−
βS
∑
i∈S αiu(qi)) = (max{U(p), U(q)} − U(q)) + βS(
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) −
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)). Hence,
0 ≤ βS(
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) −
∑
i∈S αiu(qi)) < max{U(p), U(q)} − U(q) because βS ≥ 0, so that
U(p) > U(q). Hence, V ({p, q}) − V (p) = β1α1(u(q1) − u(p1)). Since q1 ≻1 p1, we have
u(q1)− u(p1) > 0. Therefore, {p, q} % {p} if and only if V ({p, q})− V (p) ≥ 0 if and only
if β1α1(u(q1)− u(p1)) ≥ 0 if and only if β1 ≥ 0. Hence, Proposition 2 holds.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let αX1 ≤ α
Y
1 to show that X is more altruistic than Y . Fix
p, q such that pS ≻
j
S qS for all j ∈ {X, Y } and p %
Y q. Since pS ≻
j
S qS for all j ∈ {X, Y },
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then
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) >
∑
i∈S αiu(qi). First consider the case where u(p1) ≥ u(q1). Since
αX1 > 0, we obtain α
X
1 u(p1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) ≥ α
X
1 u(q1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(qi). Hence, p %
X q, as
desired. Next consider the case where u(p1) < u(q1). Since p %
Y q, then αY1 (u(p1)−u(q1)) ≥∑
i∈S αiu(qi)−
∑
i∈S αiu(pi). Since u(p1)−u(q1) < 0 and α
X
1 ≤ α
Y
1 , then α
X
1 (u(p1)−u(q1)) ≥∑
i∈S αiu(qi)−
∑
i∈S αiu(pi). Therefore, α
X
1 u(p1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) ≥ α
X
1 u(q1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(qi).
Hence, p %X q.
To show the converse, choose any p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I such that pS ≻
j
S qS, q1 ≻
j
1 p1 for all j ∈
{X, Y }, and p ∼Yq. (Such p and q exist because α1 > 0 and αi > 0 for some i ∈ S.) Hence,
αY1 u(p1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) = α
Y
1 u(q1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(qi), so that α
Y
1 =
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi)−
∑
i∈S
αiu(qi)
u(q1)−u(p1)
.
On the other hand, since X is more altruistic than Y , then p %X q, so that αX1 u(p1) +∑
i∈S αiu(pi) ≥ α
X
1 u(q1) +
∑
i∈S αiu(qi), so that
∑
i∈S
αiu(pi)−
∑
i∈S
αiu(qi)
u(q1)−u(p1)
≥ αX1 . Therefore,
αY1 ≥ α
X
1 .
Proof of Proposition 4: To show the proposition, for all j ∈ {X, Y } and p ∈ (∆(Z))I ,
define U j(p) = (1−βj1)α1u(p1)+(1+β
j
S)
∑
i∈S αiu(pi): for all j ∈ {X, Y } and for all A ∈ A ,
define V j(A) = maxp∈A U
j(p) + βj1 maxq∈A α1u(q1)− β
j
S maxr∈A
∑
i∈S αiu(ri)
First, we show (i). Choose p, q ∈ (∆(Z))I and r ∈ ∆(Z) such that (i) q1 ≻
j
1 p1, (ii)
{p, q } ≻j {q }, (iii) pS ≻
j
S qS for each j ∈ {X, Y }, and {p, q } ∼
Y {(r)i∈I}. Then, by the ar-
gument in Proposition 2, U j(p) > U j(q) for each j ∈ {X, Y }. Since %X is more pride-seeking
(less temptation-averse) than %Y , we have {p, q } %X {(r)i∈I}. Since {p, q } ∼
Y {(r)i∈I},
we have (1−βY1 )α1u(p1)+
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)+β
Y
1 α1u(q1) = V
Y ({p, q }) = u(r). Since {p, q } %X
{(r)i∈I}, we have u(r) ≤ V
X({p, q }) = (1−βX1 )α1u(p1)+
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)+β
X
1 α1u(q1). Hence,
(1−βY1 )α1u(p1)+
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)+β
Y
1 α1u(q1) ≤ (1−β
X
1 )α1u(p1)+
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)+β
X
1 α1u(q1),
so that βY1 α1(u(q1)−u(p1)) ≤ β
X
1 α1(u(q1)−u(p1)). Hence, β
Y
1 ≤ β
X
1 because u(q1) > u(p1).
To show the converse assume βY1 ≤ β
X
1 . Choose p, q ∈ (∆(Z))
I and r ∈ ∆(Z) such that
(i) q1 ≻
j
1 p1, (ii) {p, q } ≻
j {q }, (iii) pS ≻
j
S qS for each j ∈ {X, Y }, and {p, q } %
Y {(r)i∈I}.
Then, u(r) ≤ V Y ({p, q }) ≡ (1−βY1 )α1u(p1)+
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)+β
Y
1 α1u(q1) ≤ (1−β
X
1 )α1u(p1)+∑
i∈S αiu(pi) + β
X
1 α1u(q1) ≡ V
X({p, q }). So, we obtain u(r) ≤ V X({p, q }). Hence, the
converse holds.
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Next we show (ii). Choose p, q, r ∈ (∆(Z))I and l ∈ ∆(Z) such that (i) qS ≻
j
S pS,
(ii) r1 ≻
j
1 p1, (iii) {p, q, r} ≻
j {q, r} for each j ∈ {X, Y }, and {(l)i∈I} ∼
Y {p, q }. Since
%X is more shame averse than %Y , we have {(l)i∈I} %
X {p, q }. Now we will show that
U j(p) > U j(q) for all j ∈ {X, Y }. To see this note that 0 < V j({p, q, r}) − V j({q, r}) =
[
max{U j(p), U j(q), U j(r)}+βj1α1max{u(q1), u(r1)}−β
j
S max{
∑
i∈S αiu(qi),
∑
i∈S αiu(ri)}
]
−
[
max{U j(q), U j(r)}+ βj1α1max{u(q1), u(r1)} − β
j
S max{
∑
i∈S αiu(qi),
∑
i∈S αiu(ri)}
]
=
max{U j(p), U j(q), U j(r)}−max{U j(q), U j(r)}, so that U j(p) > max{U j(q), U j(r)} for each
j ∈ {X, Y }. Since qS ≻
j
S pS, we have p1 ≻
j
1 q1 for each j ∈ {X, Y }. Moreover, we have
V j({p, q}) = U j(p) + βj1α1u(p1) − β
j
S
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) = α1u(p1) + (1 + β
j
S)
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) −
βjS
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) for each j ∈ {X, Y }.
Since {(l)i∈I} ∼
Y {p, q }, we have α1u(p1) + (1 + β
Y
S )
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) − β
Y
S
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) =
V Y ({p, q}) = u(l). Since {(l)i∈I} %
X {p, q}, we have u(l) ≥ V X({p, q}) = α1u(p1) + (1 +
βXS )
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)−β
X
S
∑
i∈S αiu(qi). Hence, α1u(p1)+(1+β
X
S )
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)−β
X
S
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) ≤
α1u(p1)+(1+β
Y
S )
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)−β
Y
S
∑
i∈S αiu(qi), so that β
Y
S (
∑
i∈S αiu(qi)−
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)) ≤
βXS (
∑
i∈S αiu(qi)−
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)). Hence, β
Y
S ≤ β
X
S .
To show the converse assume βYS ≤ β
X
S . Choose p, q, r ∈ (∆(Z))
I and l ∈ ∆(Z) such
that (i) qS ≻
j
S pS, (ii) r1 ≻
j
1 p1, (iii) {p, q, r} ≻
j {q, r} for each j ∈ {X, Y }, and {(l)i∈I} %
Y
{p, q }. Then, u(l) ≥ V Y ({p, q }) ≡ α1u(p1) + (1 + β
Y
S )
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) − β
Y
S
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) ≥
α1u(p1) + (1 + β
X
S )
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) − β
X
S
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) ≡ V
X({p, q }). So, we obtain u(l) ≥
V X({p, q }). Hence, the converse holds.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let % be represented by the GU model with (u,β,α). By the
nondegeneracy, z ≻ z for some z, z ∈ Z. Normalize u such that u(z) = 1 and u(z) = 0.
For all x ∈ [0, 1] define p(x) = xδz + (1 − x)δz ∈ ∆(Z) and pS(x) = (p(x))i∈S. There
exists ε ∈ (0, 1) such that [(1− β1)α1 + (1 + βS)](1− ε) > max{(1− β1)α1, 1 + βS}. Define
pU = (p(1 − ε), pS(1 − ε)), p
1 = (p(1), pS(0)), and p
S = (p(0), pS(1)). Then, U(p
U) >
max{U(p1), U(pS)}, u(p11) > max{u(p
U
1 ), u(p
S
1 )}, and uS(p
S
S) > max{uS(p
1
S), uS(p
U
S )}. Take
any set A ∈ A . Choose any p∗ ∈ argmaxp∈A U(p) and q∗ ∈ A such that U(q∗) < U(p
∗). It
suffices to show p∗ ∈ C(A) and q∗ 6∈ C(A).
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Fix α ∈ (0, 1). Let q∗ = αpU + (1 − α)p∗ and B = {q∗} ∪ (α{p1,pS} + (1 − α)A).
Then U(q∗) > U(r) for all r ∈ B such that r 6= q∗. Moreover, u(q∗1) < u(αp
1
1 + (1 − α)p
∗
1)
and uS(q
∗
S) < uS(αp
S
S + (1 − α)p
∗
S). Then B 6∈ A
1
q∗ . We obtain V (B) − V (B \ {q
∗}) =
U(q∗) − maxr∈B\{q∗} U(r) > 0, so that B ≻ B \ {q
∗}. By Consistency, C(B) = {q∗}. By
choosing α arbitrarily small and using Closed Graph, we obtain p∗ ∈ C(A).
To show q∗ 6∈ C(A), let D = {q ∈ (∆(Z))I |U(q∗) < U(q) < U(p
∗)}. There exist
l, l ∈ ∆(Z) such that U(q∗) < u(l) < u(l) < U(p
∗). By using l and l, we can de-
fine qU , q1, qS ∈ D such that U(qU) > max{U(q1), U(qS)}, u(q11) > max{u(q
U
1 ), u(q
S
1 )},
and uS(q
S
S ) > max{uS(q
1
S), uS(q
U
S )}, as we defined p
U ,p1,pS by using z and z. Let B =
{qU , q1, qS, q∗}. Hence, V (B)− V (B \ {q
U}) = U(qU)−max{U(q1), U(qS), U(q∗)}, so that
B ≻ B \ {qU}. However, qU is not individually optimal in B. Hence, by Consistency,
C(B) = {qU}.
Define A′ = A ∪ {qU}. Since qU ∈ D, we obtain U(qU) < U(p∗), so that p∗ ∈
argmaxp∈A′ U(p). By the first part of the proof, p
∗ ∈ C(A′). Suppose that q∗ ∈ C(A)
to show a contradiction. By WARP, q∗ ∈ C(A
′) because p∗ ∈ C(A′) ∩ A. Moreover,
q∗ ∈ C(B) because q
U ∈ C(B) ∩ A′. This contradicts with C(B) = {qU}.
Proof of Proposition 6: In the following, we show (i). (ii) can be proved in the same
way. Fix z, z ∈ Z such that z ≻ z. Normalize u by u(z) = 1 and u(z) = 0. Consider
the case where α1 ≥ 1. Define q1 =
1
α1
z + α1−1
α1
z, p = (z, (z)i∈S), and q = (q1, (z)i∈S).
By a direct calculation, we obtain p ∼ q and p ≻S q.
29 Hence, Impure Altruism implies
C({p, q}) = {p}. Hence, by Proposition 5, 0 < U(p) − U(q) =
∑
i∈I αi(u(pi) − u(qi)) +
βS(
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)−
∑
i∈S αiu(qi)) + β1α1(u(q1)− u(p1)) = βS + β1, so that βS > −β1. In the
case where α1 ≤ 1, we can show the result in the same way by defining q1 = α1z+(1−α1)z.
Next, we show the converse (i.e., βS > −β1 implies Impure Altruism). Choose any
p, q ∈ ∆(Z) such that p ∼ q and pS ≻S qS to show C({p, q}) = {p}. It suffices to show that
U(p) > U(q). By assumption, β1 > −βS. Hence, U(p) − U(q) >
∑
i∈I αi(u(pi) − u(qi)) +
29Then, u(z) = 0, uS(z) = 1, u(q1) = 1/α1, and
∑
i∈S αiu(qi) = 0. Hence,
∑
i∈I αiu(pi) = 1 =∑
i∈I αiu(qi).
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βS(
∑
i∈S αiu(pi)−
∑
i∈S αiu(qi))−βSα1(u(q1)−u(p1)) = (1+βS)
∑
i∈I αi(u(pi)−u(qi)) ≥ 0,
where the equality holds because q ∼ p. Therefore, U(p) > U(q) so that C({p, q}) = {p}.
Proof of Proposition 7: First note that since u′ > 0, u′(0) = +∞, α1 > 0, and βS ≥ 0, the
budget constraint is binding (i.e., c+ d = w + τ). Hence, V ({(c, d) ∈ R2+|c+ d ≤ w + τ}) =
V ({(c, w + τ − c)|c ∈ [0, w + τ ]}) = α1u(c
∗) + (1 + βS)u(w + τ − c
∗) − βSu(w + τ), where
c∗ ∈ argmaxc∈[0,w+τ ]α1u(c) + (1 + βS)u(w + τ − c). Moreover, c
∗(α1, βS, τ) is an interior
solution determined by the first order condition: 0 = α1u
′(c∗) + (1 + βS)u
′(w + τ − c∗). For
any βS, c
∗ → 0 as α1 → 0 and c
∗ → w+ τ as α1 →∞. Therefore, by the intermediate value
theorem, for any βS ≥ 0, there exists α1(βS) such that c
∗(α1(βS), βS, τ) = w.
Define f(α1, βS, τ) = V ({(w, 0)}) − V ({(c, d) ∈ R
2
+|c + d ≤ w + τ}). Since u(0) =
0, we have f(α1, βS, τ) = α1u(w) − [α1u(c
∗) + (1 + βS)u(w + τ − c
∗) − βSu(w + τ)] =
α1(u(w)− u(c
∗))− u(w+ τ − c∗)− βS(u(w+ τ − c
∗)− u(w+ τ)). Hence, f(α1(βS), βS, τ) =
−u(τ) − βS(u(τ) − u(w + τ)) = βS(u(w + τ) − u(τ)) − u(τ). Define βS =
u(τ)
u(w+τ)−u(τ)
. It
follows that f(α1(βS), βS, τ) > 0 if and only if βS > βS.
Therefore, for any βS > βS, f tends to strictly positive as α1 → α(βS). Moreover, f
tends to strictly negative as α1 → ∞.
30 Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem,
for any βS > βS, there exists α1(βS) such that f(α1(βS), βS, τ) = 0 and ∞ > α1(βS) >
α1(βS). Moreover, f tends to strictly negative as α1 → 0.
31 Therefore, by the intermediate
value theorem, for any βS > βS, there exists α1(βS) such that f(α1(βS), βS, τ) = 0 and
0 < α1(βS) < α(βS). By this way, we have defined α1, α1 on (βS,+∞). Finally, define
α1(βS) = α1(βS) and α1(βS) = α1(βS). Then, f(α1(βS), βS, τ) = 0 = f(α1(βS), βS, τ).
By the implicit function theorem, it can be shown that ∂c
∗
∂α1
(α1, βS, τ) > 0. By the
envelop theorem, we have ∂f
∂α1
(α1, βS, τ) = u(w)− u(c
∗), hence ∂f
∂α1
(α1, βS, τ) < 0 if and only
if w < c∗(α1, βS, τ) if and only if α1 > α1(βS). In addition,
∂f
∂βS
(α1, βS, τ) = u(w + τ) −
u(w + τ − c∗) > 0.
30To see this note that, c∗ → w+ τ as α1 →∞. Hence, f(α1, βS , τ) = α1(u(w)− u(c∗))− u(w+ τ − c∗)−
βS(u(w + τ − c∗)− u(w + τ))→ −∞.
31To see this note that, c∗ → 0 as α1 → 0. Hence, f(α1, βS , τ) = α1(u(w) − u(c∗)) − u(w + τ − c∗) −
βS(u(w + τ − c∗)− u(w + τ))→ −u(w + τ).
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Remember that α1(βS) > α1(βS). Hence,
∂f
∂α1
(α1(βS), βS, τ) < 0 and
∂f
∂βS
(α1(βS), βS, τ) >
0. Since f(α1(βS), βS, τ) = 0, it follows that α1(βS) is strictly increasing.
32
Similarly, remember also that α1(βS) < α1(βS). Hence,
∂f
∂α1
(α1(βS), βS, τ) > 0 and
∂f
∂βS
(α1(βS), βS, τ) > 0. Since f(α1(βS), βS, τ) = 0, it follows that α1(βS) is strictly decreas-
ing.
Moreover, for any βS, f(α1, βS, τ) ≥ 0 if and only if α1 ∈ [α1(βS), α1(βS)] and f(α1, βS, τ) <
0 if and only if α1 < α1(βS) or α1 > α1(βS).
Proof of Proposition 8: Define dˆ ≡ d∗ + τ = d∗ + g for τ = g, where d∗ is the optimal
donation. Since u′ > 0, the budget constraints must be binding (i.e., s + w = e and
c+d = w−τ). Hence, the decision maker’s problem is as follows: maxw V ({(w−τ −d
∗, d∗+
g)|d∗ ≤ w− τ}) + δV ({(e−w, 0)}) = maxdˆ,w h(w, dˆ, τ), where h(w, dˆ, τ) = (1− β1)α1u(w−
dˆ) + (1 + βS)u(dˆ) + β1α1u(w − τ)− βSu(w) + δα1u(e− w).
If β1 = 0 = βS, then h does not depend on τ (i.e., g), so that the solution dˆ is constant
in g. Hence, (ii) holds. To show (i), assume β1 > βS. Define w
∗(dˆ, τ) = argmaxw h(w, dˆ, τ),
f(dˆ, τ) = h(w∗(dˆ, τ), dˆ, τ), and dˆ(τ) = argmaxdˆ f(dˆ, τ). Since u
′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and u′(0) =
+∞, both w∗ and dˆ are interior solutions.
We show that dˆ(τ) is strictly increasing. Given β1α1 > βS ≥ 0 and u
′′′ ≥ 0, direct
calculation shows ∂
2h(w,dˆ,τ)
∂w2
< 0.33 Moreover, ∂
2h(w,dˆ,τ)
∂w∂τ
= −β1α1u
′′(w − τ) > 0, for β1α1 >
βS ≥ 0. Therefore, by the standard result on monotone comparative statics,
∂w∗(dˆ,τ)
∂τ
> 0.
Hence, by the envelope theorem, ∂
2f(dˆ,τ)
∂dˆ∂τ
= −(1 − β1)α1u
′′(w∗(dˆ, τ)− dˆ)∂w
∗(dˆ,τ)
∂τ
> 0.
By the implicit function theorem, a direct calculation shows that ∂w
∗(dˆ,τ)
∂dˆ
< 1.34 Hence,
32To see this suppose by way of contradiction that βS < β
′
S and α1(βS) ≥ α1(β
′
S). Then, 0 =
f(α1(βS), βS , τ) < f(α1(βS), β
′
S , τ) ≤ f(α1(β
′
S), β
′
S , τ) = 0, which is a contradiction. The first inequal-
ity holds because ∂f∂βS (α1(βS), βS , τ) > 0. The second inequality holds because α1(β
′
S) > α1(β
′
S) and
∂f
∂α1
(α1, β
′
S , τ) < 0 if and only if α1 > α1(β
′
S).
33 ∂
2h(w,dˆ,τ)
∂w2 = (1 − β1)α1u
′′(w − dˆ) + β1α1u′′(w − τ) − βSu′′(w) + δα1u′′(e − w). Since u′′′ ≥ 0, then
u′′(w − τ) ≤ u′′(w) < 0. Hence, β1α1 > βS implies
∂2h(w,dˆ,τ)
∂w2 < 0.
34To see this, note that w∗(dˆ, τ) is characterized by the first order condition: 0 = ∂h(w,dˆ,τ)∂w = (1 −
β1)α1u
′(w − dˆ) + β1α1u′(w − τ) − βSu′(w) − δα1u′(e − w) ≡ k(w, dˆ, τ). By the implicit function theorem,
∂w∗(dˆ,τ)
∂dˆ
= − ∂k/∂dˆ∂k/∂w =
(
1 + β1α1u
′′(w−τ)−βSu
′′(w)+δα1u
′′(e−w)
(1−β1)α1u′′(w−dˆ)
)−1
< 1 because β1α1u
′′(w − τ)− βSu′′(w) < 0.
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∂2f(dˆ,τ)
∂dˆ2
= −(1 − β1)α1u
′′(w∗(dˆ, τ) − dˆ)(∂w
∗(dˆ,τ)
∂dˆ
− 1) + (1 + βS)u
′′(dˆ) < 0. Therefore, by the
monotone comparative statics again, dˆ is strictly increasing in τ (i.e., g).
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C Extension (Not for Publication)
In this section, to incorporate inequality aversion, we axiomatize an extended GU model, in
which uS is a maxmin utility function. We consider a decision maker who is inequality-averse
among other agents’ allocations.
It is well known that the independence axiom may fail in social context because mixtures
among allocations can offset inequality in the mixed allocation. However, mixing with con-
stant allocations does not offset inequality. Hence, we keep the following weaker version of
the independence axiom:
Definition: A set C ∈ A is called constant over S if pi = pj for any i, j ∈ S and p ∈ C.
Axiom (Weak Independence): Let α ∈ [0, 1] and A,B,C ∈ A . Suppose that C is constant
over S. Then A % B if and only if αA+ (1− α)C % αB + (1− α)C.
We need an additional axiom to make sure that %1 and %S well-defined.
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Axiom (Separability): For all p1, q1, l1, r1 ∈ ∆(Z) and pS, qS, lS, rS ∈ (∆(Z))
S, (i) (p1, lS) %
(q1, lS) if and only if (p1, rS) % (q1, rS); (ii) (l1, pS) % (l1, qS) if and only if (r1, pS) % (r1, qS).
The next axiom captures inequality aversion among other agents’ allocations.
Axiom (Quasi-Concavity) For any pS, qS ∈ (∆(Z))
S, if pS ∼S qS, then
1
2
pS +
1
2
qS %S pS.
Corollary: The following statements are equivalent:
(a) % satisfies Quasi-Concavity, Weak Independence, and Separability as well as the axioms
35I appreciate a referee who points out the necessity of this axiom.
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in the theorem except Independence.
(b) There exists an extended GU model in which
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) = minαS∈C
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) for
some C ⊂ ∆(S).
Proof: It is easy to see the necessity of the axioms. To show the sufficiency it suffices to
show the following two lemmas. First, instead of Lemma 1, we prove the next lemma by
using the standard argument with the von Neumann-Morgenstern’s theorem and Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s (1989) theorem.
Lemma 9 There exist a mixture linear function u1 on ∆(Z) and a closed subset C of ∆(S)
such that (i) u1 represents %1 on ∆(Z), (ii) there exist z, z ∈ Z such that u1(z) = 1 ≥
u1(p) ≥ 0 = u1(z) for all p ∈ ∆(Z), and (iii)
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) ≡ minα∈C
∑
i∈S αiu1(pi) repre-
sents %S.
Given the above u1 and uS, we define %
∗ in the same way as in the proof of theorem.
Weak Independence of % on A implies Independence of %∗ on A ∗.
Lemma 10 %∗ satisfies Independence*.
Proof of Lemma 10: Fix C∗ ∈ A ∗. For all x ∈ [0, 1], define p(x) = xδz + (1 −
x)δz and pS(x) = (p(x))i∈S. Then, for all u ≡ (u1, uS) ∈ [0, 1]
2, u1(p(u1)) = u1 and∑
i∈S αiu(pi(uS)) = uS. Define C = {(p(u1), pS(uS))|u ≡ (u1, uS) ∈ C
∗}. Then, C is con-
stant over S and u(C) = C∗. Therefore, by Weak Independence, A∗ %∗ B∗ ⇔ A % B ⇔
αA+ (1− α)C % αB + (1− α)C ⇔ αA∗ + (1− α)C∗ %∗ αB∗ + (1− α)C∗. 
Since %∗ satisfies the same properties as in the proof of the theorem, Lemma 4–8 hold
in the same way. Hence, the sufficiency of the axioms holds with u1 = u1(p1) and uS =
minα∈C
∑
i∈S αiu1(pi). Therefore, Corollary holds. 
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D Discussion on Experiments (Not for Publication)
In the experiments conducted by Lazear et al. (2012), we could observe that medium-level
donors exit more often than low-level and high-level donors, when playing the dictator game
is subsidized. In the experiments, 96 subjects (48 dictators) participated in five sequential
sessions of dictator games with an exit option. Lazear et al. (2012) provided dictators with
$10 as baseline endowment and, on top of that, added subsidies of $0, $1, $3, $6, and $10
to the baseline endowment in order. For each subsidy value, dictators decided whether to
play the dictator game or exit. Then, the dictators decided the donation amount publicly if
they did not exit. For each dictator, the left figure in Figure 3 (p. 14) of Section 8 shows
the minimal subsidy needed to play the dictator game and the dictator’s average donated
proportion.36 Clearly, the figure shows tendency (i).37
We found consistent evidence for the tendency in the earliest experiments on dictator
games with an exit option conducted by Dana et al. (2006). Dana et al. (2006) provided
dictators with $10 as an endowment and asked dictators the donation amount before the
dictators knew that they could exit privately. When the dictators exited, they obtained
$9 privately and receivers obtained $0 without knowing that this is a consequence of the
dictators’ choice. The right figure in Figure 3 shows the percentage of dictators who exited
and their (intended) donated proportion, which clearly exhibits the tendency.38
In the experiment conducted by Dana et al. (2006), dictators were anonymous, while in
the treatment conducted by Lazear et al. (2012), receivers could identify dictators. Hence,
the consistency between these two experiments, as captured by Figure 3, would support our
hypothesis: as long as playing dictator games is common knowledge among subjects, the
dictator would consider the receiver’s wish that the dictator should act altruistically. Hence,
36We regressed donated proportion on subsidy size. The estimated coefficient on the subsidy size is
−1.6 · 10−4 (p = 0.887), which is not significantly different from zero. Hence, the donated proportion is
statistically constant across the treatments.
37We made the left figure of Figure 3 based on the no-anonymity treatment in Experiment 2 in Lazear et
al. (2012).
38We made the right figure of Figure 3 based on Figure 1 (p.197) in Dana et al. (2006).
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the dictator could feel pride in acting altruistically by living up to the receiver’s wish and
ashamed of acting selfishly by denying their wish, even though the receiver could not identify
the dictator.
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